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Chapter 1. Political trust in the transition countries 
Transition in the early 1990s in the Central European countries and the formal Soviet Union 
was a grand institutional transformation in both international and domestic politics as well as 
economy. Political trust is important to conduct economic reforms and build the legitimacy of 
new governments. This paper aims to highlight the origin of political trust and the role of 
governments to improve the level of citizens’ confidence. This research supports that 
socialization under communism make a resistant effect toward democracy and a market 
economy, but the significance weakens when objective economic and political situations are 
included in the empirical test. Being a state-sector employee and self-employer during the 
transition is positively associated with political trust while frequent changes in jobs are 
negatively correlated. The key contribution of this research is that it adds values to the political 
trust literature by applying different components of trust (core concept, confidence in 
government, and interpersonal trust) and labor market experience. The policy implication of 
this research is valid for the economies under the transition with an institutional transformation.  
Keywords: political trust, democracy, a market economy, labor market experience 
1.1. Introduction 
“Where does individual political trust come from?” is perhaps a question to start with. 
There are two contradicting theories regarding this question; one is the socialization (or 
culturalism) theory, and the other is the institutional theory (Mishler & Rose, 2001; Pop-
Eleches & Tucker, 2014; Závecz, 2017). While the socialization theory emphasizes one’s 
experience with cultural background, the institutional theory treats political trust as an 
endogeneous factor of institutions and one’s evaluation of regimes’ economic and political 
performance. The question is hard to answer as one’s life is continuous under similar regimes; 
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therefore, cultural and institutional effects cannot to be distinguished from one another. 
However, there is one exception to explain such difficult question: the experience of citizens 
in the transition countries, which observed a grand institutional transformation from centrally-
planned communism to capitalist democracy.  
Political trust is indeed a complex concept. To make it simple, Citrin and Stroker (2018) 
explain that it is the feelings of citizens toward their government and is domain-specific. In that 
sense, this paper takes interest in citizens’ feelings toward core values (democracy and a market 
economy), government institutions (presidency, government, parliament, and political parties), 
and other citizens (interpersonal trust) along with the effect of experience under socialism. Pop-
Eleches and Tucker (2014) found evidence that an individual exposed to communism brings 
an indoctrinating effect and has low support for democracy and capitalism. While this research 
tests the direction of the effect of experience under socialism, it additionally considers the 
multivariate characteristics of political trust from specific to generalized trust.  
There is a well-known problem of understanding economic and social performance of 
a government as a source of political satisfaction, which is the reference point (to the past or to 
the current neighbor countries?) (Nye, 1997). In this regard, this study includes individual 
evaluation of political/economic situations and compare it to the past rather than the current 
evaluation. Another contribution of this paper is the investigation of the effect of labor market 
experience on political trust during the transition period. It serves as a starting point that one’s 
labor status and the number of job changes are significantly associated with the attitude towards 
political and interpersonal trust.  
The methodology of this research is ordinary least squares (OLS). Country and time 
were set as dummies to control unobserved heterogeneity across country and time. Also, this 
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study tests one’s subjective evaluation of the current political and economic situation compared 
to the past, macroeconomic variables, and basic individual characteristics (age, gender, 
education, and religious denomination) with a key independent variable (exposure to socialism). 
The novelty of this paper is that this research covers 27 transition countries in the Central 
Eastern and Baltics (CEB), Southeastern Europe (SEE), and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS)1. While previous researches focused mainly on the CEB countries, 
this research gives a more comprehensive picture of political trust of the transition countries.  
1.2. Conceptual Framework: Political Trust and Social Trust 
1.2.1. Components of political trust 
Easton (1965) established the spectrum of political support (or system support in his 
term) with two categories at extreme: specific and generalized (or diffused) political support. 
Specific political support means people’s trust in office-holders within nation-state institutions. 
It can be measured by the popularity of politicians or high-ranking government officials. On 
the other hand, generalized support is established on more abstract ideas on values and 
principles to build up the nation-state and its institutions. Theoretically, specific and 
generalized political support can be both dichotomous and continuous. In countries with fragile 
legitimacy, distrust toward incumbent high-level politicians can raise a question to their 
constitutional arrangements. However, citizens with deep historical roots of legitimacy would 
keep their firm belief in the regime even if their political leaders disappoint them.  
                                           
1 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia (CEB, 8 countries), 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia (SEE, 8 
countries), Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan (CIS, 11 countries) 
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This research adopts the framework of Norris (2017), which was established upon the 
theoretical framework of Easton (1965). Norris (2017) defines five components of political 
supports from the most specific to the most diffuse level. The first and the most specific 
component is the approval of incumbent office-holders, and this means evaluations on the 
performance and qualification of presidents, prime ministers, politicians, civil servants, etc. 
The second component deals with the confidence in regime institutions including the 
legislature, executive, judiciary, and other government bodies. The third component covers the 
evaluation of regime performance, and it is more abstract than the first two components as it 
evaluates the performance and process of government policies. The fourth component is the 
approval of the core regime, such as support for democratic ideas and rejection of autocratic 
principles. Lastly, the fifth component is the most diffused concept, which is national identities. 
This category particularly covers the feelings of patriotism and national pride.  
Researches on political trust in the post-communist countries focused on each of the 
components from the specific to generalized level as indicated in Norris’ (2017) work. On one 
hand, some studies emphasized the most specific political support toward particular 
parliamentary parties (Fidrmuc, 2000), but on the other, other research concentrated on the 
confidence in government or parliamentary institutions (Mishler & Rose, 1997; Lovell, 2001; 
Mishler & Rose, 2001; Catterberg & Moreno, 2005; Sapsford, 2006; Rothstein & Stolle, 2008; 
Závecz, 2017). In this dimension, researchers have used global surveys such as the World Value 
Survey or the New Democracies Barometer to find variables on confidence in political and 
government institutions.  
The third component (evaluation of regime performance) has also largely been explored 
in previous literature (Kasse, 1999; Earle & Gehlbach, 2003; Delhey & Newton, 2005; Kim & 
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Pirttilä, 2006; Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Chu et al., 2008; Neundorf, 2010; Chiru & 
Gherghina, 2012). For instance, government policies for privatization (Earle & Gehlbach, 2003) 
or economic reforms (Kim & Pirttilä, 2006) represent the context of the post-communist 
countries. The fourth category is more generalized political trust, which translates the approval 
of the core (new) regime, such as democracy and a market economy, in this region (Evans & 
Whitefield, 1995; Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2014). Lastly, the full stateness from the transition 
can be found in the studies of Kuzio (2001). According to Kuzio, a shared national identity is 
the precondition of democratization in the post-communist countries. 
1.2.2. Political trust and social trust 
The relationship between political trust and social trust has not been clear in existing 
empirical studies. Although many researchers failed to find strong correlations between social 
and political trust at the individual level (Kasse, 1999; Delhey & Newton, 2003), there was 
found a positively significant relationship at the country level (Delhey & Newton, 2005). From 
the aggregate-level correlation between social and political trust, Newton and Norris (2000) 
argue that general trust has a positive impact on social and political institutions and effective 
governments. Interpersonal trust differentiates the level of trust and distrust toward political 
institutions because it can ‘spill over’ to political institutions and create a civic culture (Mishler 
& Rose, 2001). The causal direction is not clear, however, because a well-functioning 
government institution can build up social capital (Rothstein & Stolle, 2008; Delhey & Newton, 
2005). In the context of the transition countries, Letki and Evans (2005) argue that 
democratization in Central and Eastern Europe entailed a ‘top-down’ process, where social 
capital was affected by political and economic institutions (Letki & Evans, 2005).  
1.3. Origins of political trust – socialization and institutionalism 
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Political trust or system support or confidence in government institutions are basically 
the good (bad) feeling of citizens towards their government (Citrin & Stoker, 2018). From the 
individual viewpoint, as shown in Figure 1, the course of political trust can be summarized as 
two parts – socialization and institutional theories. The early debate on the two origins of 
political trust – socialization and institutionalism - was well addressed in Mishler and Rose’s 
paper (2001). According to the socialization theory, political trust is exogenous as it is shaped 
by cultural norms and early-life socialization. For example, the exposure of communism 
indoctrinated individuals’ attitudes with the suppression of the private sector and heavy reliance 
on the central government rather than resistance against the old system (Pop-Eleches, 2007; 
Neundorf, 2010; Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2014).  
Furthermore, failures of the planned economy allowed people to use inter-personal 
relations to cope with socio-economic problems rather than relying on public institutions and 
laws. Therefore, the new democracy inherited low levels of trust even after the collapse of the 
previous regime (Rose-Ackerman, 2001). Comparing the East Germans with West Germans, 
Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) found that communism shifted individual preferences 
toward a more redistributive government due to both direct and indirect impact (through 
economic downturn). 
On the contrary, institutional theories insist that political trust is endogenous to 
institutional performance, and thus it is conditioned by government capabilities (Mishler & 
Rose, 1997; Mishler & Rose, 2001). Several studies have analyzed government performance 
and political trust. For example, Stevenson and Wolfers (2011) studied such a relationship in 
the U.S. context, and they evinced that the increasing unemployment resulted in a great loss in 
confidence in the government as well as the financial sector. In the European context, Van Erkel 
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and Van Der Meer (2015) found that longitudinal changes in economic performance – 
economic growth, government deficits, unemployment rate, and inflation – affected the level 
of political trust.  
1.4. Government Performance and Political Trust in the Context of Transition  
1.4.1. Political trust and government performance  
Government performance and its evaluation are at the center of the institutionalism 
theory. However, it is not a simple concept and needs to be carefully analyzed in research. 
Political trust is a relational and domain-specific concept (i.e., A trusts B to do X) (Citrin & 
Stoker, 2018). Citizens evaluate their government with its performance of their interested 
policy areas. The mechanism is graphically shown in Figure 1. A government decides how to 
utilize scarce resources in the society by implementing policies. In the process of decision 
making and implementation, the government chooses a certain time frame and expects the 
impact of the policies. Once the policies become effective, results would be discovered, and 
the citizens would evaluate the performance based on their everyday experience and the eyes 
of the mass media.  
 As Nye (1997) pointed out, there are several problems of recognizing government 
performance as a cause of political satisfaction/dissatisfaction. First, it is hard to measure 
government performance (whose performance compared to what?). For example, Van Erkel 
and Van Der Meer (2015) argue that economic performance of a nation is meaningful to 
understand political support when it is compared to one’s own past performance rather than to 
other countries.  
 Second, each individual has different perception of the role of government. People who 
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experienced communism tend to support state intervention because they are inclined to believe 
that it is the government’s responsibility to secure citizens’ living when someone becomes 
unemployed or needy (Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007). Third, the evaluation of 
performance depends on one’s perception of distance from the government (either federal or 
local government) or the gap between real and perceived performance. In this context, citizens’ 
everyday experience through government services is important. When someone witnesses daily 
small-scale corruption, it lowers his/her support for the political regime in power (Reisinger, 
2017). 
On the aggregate level, political trust can be changed due to 1) below ps - partisanship 
and polarization and 2) process and probity (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2008; Citrin & Stoker, 
2018). First, partisanship and polarization can be a source of the downward trend of political 
trust as it amplifies conflicts between parties and increases brinkmanship. Second, citizens 
evaluate the government not only based on the outcome but also the process and probity. The 
hypothesis of this research proposes that when the government shows respect to its citizens and 
gives them a fair hearing, citizens become willing to overcome some painful results for long-
term policy goals. Other hypothesis presents that political trust depends on the citizens’ views 
of the national congress; therefore, the legitimacy of representative democracy can be 




Figure 1. Conceptual framework of political trust in the post-communist context 
 
Source: author 
1.4.2. Transition as a large-scale institutional change and political trust 
Institutional context is an important aspect in explaining political trust as it influences 
citizens’ policy preferences as well as patterns of social division (Edlund, 1999). For example, 
the design of a tax system under the welfare state regime would determine government 
legitimacy (Edlund, 1999) and the power of income on the policy preferences for redistribution 
(Beramendi & Rehm, 2016). In such a way, individual positions and demands are determinants 
of the level of political trust. Different factors, such as the occupational status of individuals, 
income, and their perception of social mobility, shape the preferences for redistribution 
(Guillaud, 2013).  
The transition economies should be analyzed in the context that they underwent a large-
scale institutional change from communism to democracy, from a centrally planned economy 
to a market economy, and from satellite states to full stateness (Závecz, 2017). Each 
government implemented transition policies such as privatization, enterprise restructuring, 
price liberalization and competition, trade and foreign exchange systems, and banking reforms. 
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The newly introduced capitalist democracy needs trust to establish the fundamental for 
commercial exchange, contracts, agreements between people, and confidence in the legitimacy 
of the new government (Lovell, 2001). However, the low level of political trust in the post-
communist countries remains as one of the consistent obstacles in previous literature (Mishler 
& Rose, 1997; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Lovell, 2001; Letki & Evans, 2005; Sapsford, 2006). 
The lack of trust (or distrust) in government continues to be a problem in this region as it has 
a great influence on voter turnout, policy preferences, and citizens’ compliance.  
In addition, the post-communist countries show regional divergence. While the former 
Soviet Republics2 experienced a consistent decline in confidence in the parliament both in the 
initial period of transition and consolidation period, the new democracies in the Central and 
Eastern European countries 3  saw much significant decrease in confidence in the later 
consolidation period due to the ‘post-honeymoon disillusion’ (Catterberg & Moreno, 2005). 
Among three big institutional changes, the process of economic transformation includes 
the creation and development of a market economy, property rights, and other political and 
legal changes, leading to privatization and economic restructuring (Dewatripont & Roland, 
1996).  
From another perspective, the transition countries can be understood as a part of young 
democracy. The institutional transformation gave path to the declining political trust due to the 
‘post-honeymoon disillusionment’ rather than the existence of critical citizens (Catterberg & 
Moreno, 2005). Also, citizens in the young democracy might show different levels of trust in 
                                           
2 Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine 
3 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia 
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each component of political trust. For example, citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic showed pro-
democracy attitudes concerning corruption, but they expressed distrust in existing government 
institutions at the same time (Collins & Gambrel, 2017). This indicates that past experiences 
of the authoritarian political power with the lack of democratic participation and commodity 
shape citizens’ perception of the role of government and the measurement of its performance.  
1.4.3. Economic reform of the transition governments and political trust 
 Under the complex process of the institutional change, citizens in the transition 
countries were left with a great uncertainty about who would benefit after the reform was 
complete. Considering that political trust is essential for the pursuit of social investment 
(meaning citizens first pay the cost, expecting subsequent benefits) (Jacobs & Matthews, 2017), 
public support was the key to successful economic restructuring for stabilization in the 
transition countries. In this sense, civic culture matters in the relationship between uncertainty 
and political trust. The lack of civic culture strengthens citizens demand for more state 
regulations and intervention even though they recognize corruption. When people believe that 
entrepreneur activities are using uncivic methods, they would want more regulations – although 
it is administered by corrupt government officials – to control the entry of entrepreneurs 
(Aghion et al., 2010). 
 Early debates on the governments’ economic reform policies and political trust 
establishment focused on the speed and magnitude of policy implementation. On the one side, 
advocates of the “big bang” approach supported speedy and comprehensive economic and 
structural reforms when the “window of opportunity” was created at the early state of the 
institutional transformation. On the other side, the gradualist strategy supported a sequential 
reform implementation to check up the policy success at each stage (Roland, 2002; Iwasaki & 
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Suzuki, 2016).  
 The core question of the debate was how to build up citizens’ support for economic 
reforms in the trade-off between ex ante political constraints (feasibility constraints) and ex 
post constraints (backlash and political reversal) (Roland, 2002). In reality, policymakers of the 
actual economic reforms in the transition countries argued that the dichotomy between the big 
bang and gradual approach was not clearly defined because the structural reform policies were 
the series of incomplete and spontaneous policy implementation before the conceived “window 
of opportunity” closed down (Sonin, 2013). Some scholars argue that perceived fairness in the 
process of economic and political transformation – rather than the speed and magnitude of 
reforms – is more important to political trust (Mishler & Rose, 1997; Kluegel & Mason, 2004).  
 The change of institutional settings produced winners and losers in the transition 
countries. A previous empirical study on four European transition countries (the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic) found that private employers, office 
workers, and highly-educated citizens benefitted from the economic reform and thus supported 
reformist parties (Orazem & Vodopivec, 1995 (for Slovenia); Brainerd, 1998 (for Russia); 
Fidrmuc, 2000).  
 Although the institutional framework resulted in positive effects on certain 
demographic groups, institutional choice and vested interest groups were endogenously 
determined. In fact, autocrats, who had economic and political rent before the transition, 
preferred a low quality of institutions and government to secure their monopoly power 
(Melville & Mironyuk, 2016). One of the notable examples is Russian oligarchs, they are, large 
private owners other than politicians or government officials. Although they made a 
contribution to Russia’s economic recovery, they simultaneously weakened Russia’s economic 
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and democratic institutions through the capture of state (Guriev & Rachinsky, 2005). Mass 
privatization before the establishment of institutions to secure property rights allows powerful 
individuals to strip state assets and gives them incentives to vote against the rule of law (Hoff 
& Stiglitz, 2004).  
 The grand institutional change in the post-communist countries has been almost 30 
years. Some even said the transition ends with academic legacies of the formation of modern 
political economies in development issues and of economic reform disciplines (Sonin, 2013). 
Although the initial economic reform package was due in the 1990s and 2000s, the governance 
gap of the transition countries compared to advanced economies still persists, leading to 
negative consequences, such as spreading uncertainty in society, damaged competitiveness, 
and unequal opportunities (EBRD, 2019). Accordingly, this study on political trust in the 
transition economies is not confined to the post-communist countries but presents important 
lessons of economic development and reform policies with the institutional transformation to 
other regions. 
1.5. Research design to contribute to the previous political trust discussion 
This research investigates important issues of the origin of political trust. Unlike other 
countries, the transition countries give a unique research opportunity as there is a discrepancy 
in the institutional context before and after the transition. It can also be interpreted as the legacy 
of communism in terms of people’s attitude toward government. Economic performance is 
represented as a subjective evaluation (compared to their own past) as well as objective 
macroeconomic indicators. To emphasize the role of individual experience as a mechanism to 
the formulation of political trust, this research included the individual labor market history in 
the regression. Political trust, the dependent variable, is two-folds – the core concepts of 
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democracy and a market economy and the confidence in government institutions – and 
interpersonal trust was tested afterwards.  
1.6. Empirical strategy 
This research aims to test culturalism and institutionalism in three dimensions; they are, 
social trust, confidence in government institutions, and the core concepts of the new regime 
(i.e., democracy and a market economy). The main motivation of this research is Pop-Eleches 
and Tucker’s study (2014), in which the socialization theory was tested using the “age-period-
cohort (APC)” effect. To test the origin of political trust in the post-communist countries, the 
main independent variable was built on the “cohort effect,” where the cohort means the group 
of people who experienced the communist rule. The challenge of this research question was to 
isolate this cohort effect from the age and period effects.  
The main data of this research was the Life in the Transition Survey (LITS) created by 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in collaboration with the World 
Bank (WB). The aim of the data is to survey public attitudes, well-being, and the impact of 
economic and political changes in more than 30 transition countries and also their neighboring 
countries for a comparison. It was conducted three times in the year 2006, 2010, and 2016. This 
study selected 27 transition countries from CEB, SEE, and CIS (see Table 1). 
The basic regression model is as follows:  
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑦𝑐 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Exposure𝑖𝑦𝑐 + 𝛽2Political Situation𝑖𝑦𝑐 + 
𝛽3Economic Situation𝑖𝑦𝑐 + 𝛽4log (GDPpercap PPP)𝑦𝑐 + 𝛽5UR𝑦𝑐 + 
𝛽6Inflation𝑦𝑐 + 𝑋′γ + 𝛽7History𝑖𝑐 + 𝜃𝑐 + 𝜑𝑦 + 𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑦 
The dependent variable 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑦𝑐 is the level of trust of individual i of country c in 
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year y. In terms of trust, it is composed of three dimensions. One is the approval of the core 
system (democracy and a market economy), and it was coded as 1 if one answers that a market 
economy (or democracy) is preferable to any other form of economic (or political) system. 
Second is the level of trust in national institutions (presidency, government, parliament, and 
political parties), and each answer was scaled from 1 (completely distrust) to 5 (completely 
trust). The last dependent variable is general trust. The survey asked “generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with 
people?,” and the answers were also scaled from 1 (completely distrust) to 5 (completely trust). 
The key independent variable of this paper is 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑦𝑐 , which is the years of 
exposure to the communist rule of individual i of country c in year y. The identification strategy 
was to utilize the within-country variation (years of living under the communist regime when 
an individual turned age six) and the cross-country differences of the communism period 
(1918-1989 for CIS countries and 1945-1989 for European countries). In addition to this, other 
individual- and country-level control variables were added in the regression. First is the 
perception of the political and economic situation ( Political Situation𝑖𝑦𝑐  and  
Economic Situation𝑖𝑦𝑐 ). LITS asked whether the economic (political) situation in their 
country was better today than around 4 years ago. Again, the answers were scaled from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  
Second, macroeconomic variables were added as independent variables, such as log of 
GDP per capita (PPP adjusted), unemployment rate, and inflation rate 
( log (GDPpercap PPP)𝑦𝑐 , UR𝑦𝑐 , and Inflation𝑦𝑐 ). The macroeconomic variables were 
extracted from the World Development Indicators. Third is a vector of individual characteristics 
(𝑋′γ), such as age, gender (1 if one is a female, 0 otherwise), religion (1 if one has a religion, 
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0 otherwise), education (1 no degree/no education, 2 compulsory school education, 3 secondary 
education, 4 professional and vocational school/training, 5 higher professional degree 
(university, college), and 6 post graduate degree), and health status (ranging from 1 (very bad) 
to 5 (very good)).  
 Lastly, as the personal employment situation is a crucial factor for one’s political 
attitude (Hayo, 2004), variables for labor market experience in the transition period (from 1989 
to 2006) were added (History𝑖𝑐). The first wave of LITS surveyed individual history under 
socialism, and the respondents’ answers were recreated as variables, such as the number of jobs 
as an employee, a self-employer, the number of moves to a better or worse job, if one ever 
experienced voluntary or involuntary job switches, the number of years in the state-sector 
employment, and the number of years receiving unemployment benefits. One’s specific labor 
market experience gives a more concrete picture of determinants to the system than the status 
or types of employment.  
Table 1. Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables      
core value      
market economy 87,631 0.40 0.49 0 1 
democracy 89,403 0.53 0.50 0 1 
trust in national institutions      
presidency 91,458 3.09 1.38 1 5 
government  93,539 2.72 1.33 1 5 
parliament 92,567 2.59 1.29 1 5 
political parties 90,980 2.36 1.22 1 5 
General trust      
trust 93,786 2.80 1.13 1 5 
      
Independent variables      
experience under socialism 80,070 23.17 13.20 1 65 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
age 97,946 47.41 17.62 18 99 
age squared 97,946 2558.27 1766.64 324 9801 
female 97,938 0.59 0.49 0 1 
religion 96,717 0.91 0.28 0 1 
education 97,953 3.47 1.06 1 6 
health 97,644 3.41 0.96 1 5 
      
Labor market experience in 
transition  
     
Number of Jobs as an employee 27,002 1.01 0.99 0 6 
Number of years as a self-employer 26,993 1.05 3.35 0 18 
Number of moves to a better job 3,790 1.27 1.98 0 18 
Number of moves to a worse job 3,862 4.03 4.97 0 18 
Ever experienced voluntary job 
switches 
12,172 0.58 0.49 0 1 
Ever experienced involuntary job 
switches 
11,951 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Number of years in state-sector 
employment 
27,002 4.43 6.23 0 18 
Number of years receiving 
unemployment benefits 
3,610 1.53 2.46 0 18 
      
Transition countries      
Latvia 97,969 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Lithuania 97,969 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Slovak Republic 97,969 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Slovenia 97,969 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Estonia 97,969 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Czech Republic 97,969 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Poland 97,969 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Hungary 97,969 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Croatia 97,969 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Bulgaria 97,969 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Romania 97,969 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Albania 97,969 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Bosnia 97,969 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Macedonia 97,969 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Montenegro 97,969 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Serbia 97,969 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Belarus 97,969 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Kazakhstan 97,969 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Armenia 97,969 0.04 0.19 0 1 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Azerbaijan 97,969 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Georgia 97,969 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Kyrgyzstan 97,969 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Moldova 97,969 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Tajikistan 97,969 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Ukraine 97,969 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Uzbekistan 97,969 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Russian Federation 97,969 0.04 0.20 0 1 
 
1.7. Key findings 
1.7.1. Descriptive analysis 
For a cross-country comparison, Figure 2 descriptively shows the level of political trust 
and general trust in the transition countries and the EU. The EU countries include France, 
Sweden, the U.K. (in 2010), and Germany (in 2016). The preferences for the core concepts 
(democracy and a market economy) declined in the CEB and SEE countries from 2006 to 2010 
while there showed an increase in the CIS countries. The preferences for both democracy and 
a market economy were higher in the EU countries, but the level of trust for a market economy 
in the CIS countries were almost comparable to the EU in 2010. By contrast, the level of trust 
in the CEB countries decreased in 2010, and it can be the reflection of the economic downturn 
started from 2008 in the region.  
Second, trust in national institutions showed regional diversity. On one hand, the level 
of trust in the SEE countries was the lowest whereas the CIS countries reported the highest. 
The confidence in the presidency in the CIS countries even surpassed that of the EU countries. 
The distrust in government institutions in the CEB countries supports the observation in 
previous literature (Mishler & Rose, 2001; Závecz, 2017). The puzzling level of trust in the 
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core concepts (at least during the economic crisis) and national institutions in the CIS region 
can be partly explained by the low civic culture. According to Aghion et al. (2010), low civic 
culture leads to more demand for government intervention in social problems even when 
political corruption is present. As such, economic difficulties might have triggered an increase 
in political trust in the CIS region. 
Third, the level of general trust in the post-communist countries showed less divergence 
across the transition regions. General trust of the transition countries increased in 2010 and 
then decreased in 2016. The level of trust was slightly below the EU level. 
 








Note. Author’s calculation from LITS  
 
1.7.2. Empirical results 
Table 2 shows results of the regression for the core concepts under the democratic 
capitalist systems. The preference for a market economy and democracy decreased around 
0.0018, 0.0017 for column (1) and column (2), respectively. It can be interpreted as one year 
of experience under the socialist rule is correlated with the less preference for the political and 
economic system around 0.002. As the mean year of experience under socialism is around 23 
years (Table 1), on average, the exposure to socialism is associated with 0.046 (23 * 0.002): 
less preference for democracy and a market economy more than any other system. Considering 
that the preference for capitalist democracy is a dummy variable between 0 and 1, the number 
represents 4.6 percent of the total magnitude of the variable. 
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As one recognized that the political (or economic) situation was better than the past, it 
increased the preference to democracy and market economy. When the macro variables were 
counted, however, the experience under socialism became statistically insignificant. Therefore, 
the social and economic environment presented as macroeconomic variables were more 
important than the experience under socialism. The coefficients for individual characteristics 
support Hayo’s work (2004) as older, female, and less educated respondents were less 
supportive to democracy and market economy.  
The r-squared of Table 2 shows approximately 0.05 (ranged from 0.048 to 0.066) and 
is comparable to the baseline regression of Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2014)’s study without 
country and year dummies (0.057). The difference might be from the number of years of study; 




Table 2. Political trust in the core values of a market economy and democracy 














-0.00182*** -0.00173** -0.00152** -0.00152** -0.000570 -0.000579 
(0.000675) (0.000720) (0.000713) (0.000756) (0.000722) (0.000766) 
Political 
situation  
  0.0209*** 0.0306*** 0.0177*** 0.0270*** 
  (0.00231) (0.00231) (0.00233) (0.00234) 
Economic 
situation 
  0.0352*** 0.0241*** 0.0292*** 0.0183*** 
  (0.00227) (0.00228) (0.00233) (0.00234) 
log (GDP per 
capita PPP) 
      0.161*** 0.139*** 
      (0.0348) (0.0349) 
Unemploymen
t rate 
      -0.000944 -0.00180* 
      (0.000989) (0.00100) 
Inflation 
      0.00233** 0.00170* 
      (0.000972) (0.000986) 
Age 
0.00346** 0.00468*** 0.00364** 0.00540*** 0.00197 0.00340** 
(0.00138) (0.00143) (0.00148) (0.00152) (0.00150) (0.00155) 
Age squared 
-0.000037*** -0.000040*** -0.000041*** -0.000049*** -0.000032*** -0.000037*** 
(0.00000884) (0.00000906) (0.00000948) (0.00000968) (0.00000962) (0.00000983) 
Female 
-0.0360*** -0.0284*** -0.0332*** -0.0268*** -0.0303*** -0.0231*** 
(0.00369) (0.00372) (0.00380) (0.00383) (0.00386) (0.00390) 
Religion 
0.0163** 0.0174** 0.00982 0.0145* 0.00176 0.00313 
(0.00707) (0.00719) (0.00728) (0.00742) (0.00729) (0.00742) 
Education 
0.0363*** 0.0531*** 0.0347*** 0.0505*** 0.0376*** 0.0540*** 
(0.00179) (0.00179) (0.00186) (0.00185) (0.00189) (0.00188) 
Health 
0.0465*** 0.0413*** 0.0384*** 0.0341*** 0.0366*** 0.0324*** 
(0.00224) (0.00228) (0.00234) (0.00238) (0.00237) (0.00241) 
         
country 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
         
N 71,057 72,392 65,824 66,992 63,418 64,675 
R-sq 0.048 0.051 0.060 0.063 0.061 0.066 




Table 3 is the same model as Table 2 but with different dependent variables; such 
variables indicate trust in national institutions. Again, the exposure to socialism decreased the 
confidence in national institutions, and the magnitude of the coefficients was around 0.0038 
(column (1) to (4)). On average, the experience under socialism (around 23 years, refer to Table 
1) is associated with a decrease of preference for democracy and a market economy around 
0.087 (0.0038 * 23), which is the amount of 8.7 percent. However, when the macro variables 
were accounted, the exposure variable lost its significance.  
Among the macro-level variables, log of GDP per capita (PPP adjusted) was negatively 
correlated with political trust, and it is due to the less political trust in the CEB and SEE (where 
the log of GDP per capita is higher) countries than the CIS countries. Just as the core concepts, 
trust in the institutions was affected by the socio-economic environment rather than the amount 
of experience under the socialist regime. The subjective political and economic situation was 
positively correlated with political trust. Unlike the confidence in the core concepts, females 
showed more trust in the institutions while less confidence was revealed among more educated 




Table 3. Political trust in national institutions 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  Presidency Government Parliament 
Political 
Parties 
Presidency Government Parliament 
Political 
Parties 






-0.00390** -0.00388** -0.00377** -0.00348** -0.00262 -0.00298* -0.00340** -0.00303* -0.000942 -0.0000337 -0.0000148 0.000788 
(0.00186) (0.00180) (0.00176) (0.00171) (0.00188) (0.00175) (0.00172) (0.00171) (0.00191) (0.00178) (0.00174) (0.00173) 
Political 
situation  
    0.272*** 0.322*** 0.277*** 0.213*** 0.265*** 0.312*** 0.264*** 0.199*** 
    (0.00589) (0.00559) (0.00547) (0.00538) (0.00596) (0.00563) (0.00548) (0.00537) 
Economic 
situation 
    0.132*** 0.162*** 0.152*** 0.136*** 0.128*** 0.152*** 0.138*** 0.121*** 




          -0.602*** -0.432*** -0.499*** -0.141* 
          (0.0815) (0.0795) (0.0793) (0.0804) 
Unemploy-
ment rate 
          -0.00652*** -0.000301 -0.00353 0.00713*** 
          (0.00245) (0.00224) (0.00218) (0.00216) 
Inflation 
          0.00922*** 0.0134*** 0.0182*** 0.0226*** 
          (0.00240) (0.00223) (0.00218) (0.00223) 
Age 
0.00353 -0.00417 -0.00569 -0.00248 0.00779** 0.00249 0.00203 0.00239 0.00338 -0.00439 -0.00587* -0.00550 
(0.00367) (0.00356) (0.00352) (0.00344) (0.00373) (0.00353) (0.00350) (0.00349) (0.00379) (0.00360) (0.00354) (0.00352) 
Age 
squared 
0.0000704*** 0.000129*** 0.000127*** 0.0000886*** 0.0000137 0.0000527** 0.0000473** 0.0000351 0.0000437* 0.0000976*** 0.0000981*** 0.0000814*** 
(0.0000230) (0.0000224) (0.0000221) (0.0000217) (0.0000233) (0.0000222) (0.0000220) (0.0000220) (0.0000237) (0.0000226) (0.0000222) (0.0000222) 
Female 
0.0513*** 0.0273*** 0.0174** -0.00202 0.0543*** 0.0318*** 0.0193** 0.00115 0.0589*** 0.0381*** 0.0261*** 0.00835 
(0.00928) (0.00894) (0.00872) (0.00856) (0.00904) (0.00840) (0.00832) (0.00838) (0.00920) (0.00857) (0.00842) (0.00840) 
Religion 
0.0881*** 0.151*** 0.169*** 0.182*** 0.0630*** 0.115*** 0.138*** 0.151*** 0.0471** 0.0857*** 0.103*** 0.117*** 
(0.0187) (0.0174) (0.0167) (0.0159) (0.0184) (0.0164) (0.0161) (0.0160) (0.0184) (0.0163) (0.0160) (0.0158) 
Education 
0.00579 -0.00452 -0.0187*** -0.0411*** 0.00152 -0.00798* -0.0208*** -0.0433*** 0.00971** 0.00592 -0.00497 -0.0300*** 
(0.00462) (0.00445) (0.00432) (0.00420) (0.00453) (0.00421) (0.00415) (0.00413) (0.00461) (0.00429) (0.00420) (0.00415) 
Health 
0.121*** 0.135*** 0.130*** 0.123*** 0.0675*** 0.0658*** 0.0694*** 0.0699*** 0.0655*** 0.0608*** 0.0627*** 0.0616*** 
(0.00582) (0.00557) (0.00541) (0.00529) (0.00575) (0.00531) (0.00522) (0.00522) (0.00583) (0.00539) (0.00527) (0.00525) 
               
country 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
year 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
               
N 73,772 75,496 74,712 73,382 68,428 70,072 69,476 68,398 66,801 67,484 66,970 66,134 
R-sq 0.226 0.197 0.189 0.135 0.31 0.331 0.303 0.22 0.291 0.292 0.263 0.185 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 4. General trust and experience under socialism. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  trust trust trust 
Experience under socialism 0.00204 0.00134 -0.00125 
 (0.00166) (0.00173) (0.00175) 
Political situation   0.111*** 0.116*** 
  (0.00525) (0.00529) 
Economic situation  0.0720*** 0.0637*** 
  (0.00519) (0.00531) 
log (GDP per capita PPP)   
-0.648*** 
   (0.0810) 
Unemployment rate   
-0.0295*** 
   (0.00219) 
Inflation   
-0.0178*** 
   (0.00216) 
Age -0.00274 0.000707 0.00465 
 (0.00331) (0.00349) (0.00354) 
Age squared 0.0000506** 0.0000215 0.00000303 
 (0.0000207) (0.0000219) (0.0000222) 
Female 0.00953 0.0176** 0.0133 
 (0.00820) (0.00836) (0.00844) 
Religion 0.0244 -0.000222 0.00941 
 (0.0156) (0.0160) (0.0161) 
Education 0.0561*** 0.0562*** 0.0574*** 
 (0.00404) (0.00413) (0.00418) 
Health 0.141*** 0.113*** 0.111*** 
 (0.00521) (0.00536) (0.00541) 
    
country dummies yes yes yes 
year dummies yes yes yes 
    
N 75,655 69,598 66,998 
R-sq 0.062 0.089 0.094 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
General trust was not significantly correlated with the experience under socialism 
(Table 4). Among other independent variables, the subjective recognition of the political and 
economic situation and the education and health status were significantly and positively 





Table 5. Labor market experience during the transition and political trust 








Number of Jobs 
as an employee 
-0.00523 -0.00126 -0.0186* -0.0539*** -0.0540*** -0.0506*** 0.00412 
(0.00372) (0.00368) (0.00969) (0.00870) (0.00849) (0.00817)  (0.00896) 
22155 22153 20707 21369 21361 21020 21531 
 0.084 0.084 0.263 0.234 0.22 0.144 0.096 
Number of years 
as a self-
employer 
 0.00316*** 0.00220** 0.000596 0.00344 -0.00284 -0.00395 -0.00383 
(0.000978) (0.000967) (0.00265) (0.00246) (0.00239) (0.00242)  (0.00243)  
22149 22147 20702 21364 21357 21014 21525 
 0.084 0.084 0.263 0.233 0.219 0.143 0.096 
Number of 
moves to a 
better job 
0.00162 0.00626 -0.0196* -0.0161 -0.0173 -0.00289 0.008 
(0.00456) (0.00452) (0.0114) (0.0111) (0.0108) (0.0106) (0.0108) 
3194 3192 3030 3112 3110 3100 3117 
 0.089 0.102 0.204 0.185 0.179 0.108 0.068 
Number of 
moves to a 
worse job 
-0.000148 -0.000790 -0.00663 -0.00598 -0.00769 -0.00645 0.00274 
(0.00200) (0.00195) (0.00549) (0.00490) (0.00470) (0.00452) (0.00507) 
3274 3274 3120 3183 3177 3167 3191 





0.0164 0.00581 -0.0521* -0.0204 0.00956 -0.0165 0.01 
(0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0276) (0.0256) (0.0247) (0.0241)  (0.0254) 
10475 10473 9826 10110 10115 9984 10225 





-0.0224** -0.00372 0.0171 -0.0302 -0.0488** -0.0385 -0.0603** 
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0274) (0.0255) (0.0246) (0.0238) (0.0252) 
10283 10281 9640 9921 9926 9802 10038 
 0.089 0.092 0.246 0.221 0.208 0.138 0.088 
Number of years 
in state-sector 
employment 
0.000503 0.00149*** 0.00154 0.00251* 0.00204 0.000513  0.023*** 
(0.000586) (0.000577)  (0.00154) (0.00144) (0.00141) (0.00138) (0.00144)  
22155 22153 20707 21369 21361 21020 21531 
 0.084 0.084 0.263 0.233 0.219 0.143 0.097 





-0.00333 -0.00415 -0.00654 0.000865 -0.00527 0.00865 0.000205 
(0.00367) (0.00378)  (0.0112) (0.0107) (0.0105) (0.00984) (0.00983) 
3174 3173 3025 3077 3075 3071 3070 
0.086 0.104 0.155 0.179 0.165 0.093 0.099 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each regression is a separate regression, and 
only the coefficient of labor market experience is shown. Other independent variables include the perception of the political 
and economic situation, macroeconomic variables, and individual characteristics (age, gender, education, and health). 
The labor market experience is a dimension of everyday experience, and it can be one 
mechanism to evaluate the performance of government. Indeed, the individual job market 
experience during the transition was closely correlated with political and general trust (Table 
5). The number of jobs as an employee was negatively correlated with trust in national 
institutions while the number of years as a self-employer showed a positive correlation with 
support toward market economy and democracy. The self-employers were the new sector after 
the transition (Boeri & Terrell, 2002), and they showed political support for the new regime of 
democracy and market economy. The number of moves to a better job was not correlated with 
political trust but only for trust in presidency, which appeared negative. Although one ever 
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experienced voluntary job switches, he or she showed less support for the presidency. Moreover, 
if one ever experienced involuntary job switches, he or she showed less support for market 
economy and the parliament. It was also revealed that those individuals expressed less general 
trust. The number of years in the state-sector was positively correlated with the support for 
democracy, government, and general trust. The number of moves to a worse job and the number 
of years receiving unemployment benefits were not significantly correlated with political trust 
nor general trust.  
1.8. Discussion 
This paper used the robust standard errors in the main regressions to test the statistical 
significance. However, academic journals usually recommend to use clustered standard errors 
by country level. Therefore, the regression results with clustered errors are shown in the 
discussion session for further studies with more robust standard errors (Table 6 to 9). Overall, 
the regression results showed that the experience under communism lost their statistical 
significance once the standard errors were clustered. This is possibly because LITS has been 
conducted only three times so far (2006, 2010, and 2016), and the experience under socialism 
was calculated in the identical way by country (years of living under the communist regime 
when individuals turned age six, and the communism period was identical in one country; 







Table 6. Political trust in core values of a market economy and democracy 













-0.00182 -0.00173 -0.00152 -0.00152 -0.000570 -0.000579 
(0.00118) (0.00133) (0.00120) (0.00137) (0.00131) (0.00134) 
Political 
situation  
  0.0209*** 0.0306*** 0.0177*** 0.0270*** 
  (0.00485) (0.00540) (0.00477) (0.00491) 
Economic 
situation 
  0.0352*** 0.0241*** 0.0292*** 0.0183*** 
  (0.00576) (0.00559) (0.00423) (0.00495) 
log (GDP per 
capita PPP) 
      0.161* 0.139 
      (0.0892) (0.113) 
Unemployment 
rate 
      -0.000944 -0.00180 
      (0.00354) (0.00589) 
Inflation 
      0.00233 0.00170 
      (0.00316) (0.00340) 
Age 
0.00346* 0.00468* 0.00364* 0.00540** 0.00197 0.00340 
(0.00187) (0.00240) (0.00191) (0.00247) (0.00218) (0.00245) 
Age squared 
-0.0000367*** -0.0000403*** -0.0000408*** -0.0000485*** -0.0000323** -0.0000367** 
(0.0000115) (0.0000141) (0.0000117) (0.0000144) (0.0000131) (0.0000146) 
Female 
-0.0360*** -0.0284*** -0.0332*** -0.0268*** -0.0303*** -0.0231*** 
(0.00559) (0.00547) (0.00499) (0.00523) (0.00475) (0.00455) 
Religion 
0.0163 0.0174 0.00982 0.0145 0.00176 0.00313 
(0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0154) (0.0150) (0.0134) (0.0121) 
Education 
0.0363*** 0.0531*** 0.0347*** 0.0505*** 0.0376*** 0.0540*** 
(0.00470) (0.00577) (0.00419) (0.00527) (0.00348) (0.00442) 
Health 
0.0465*** 0.0413*** 0.0384*** 0.0341*** 0.0366*** 0.0324*** 
(0.00596) (0.00556) (0.00470) (0.00483) (0.00452) (0.00487) 
         
country 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
         
N 71,057 72,392 65,824 66,992 63,418 64,675 
R-sq 0.048 0.051 0.060 0.063 0.061 0.066 
Note. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Table 6 replicates the regression of political trust in core values (democracy and a market 
economy) on the experience under socialism and other individual variables with the clustered 
errors. The independent variable, the experience under socialism, lost its significance when the 
standard error became more robust. However, subjective economic and political evaluations 
compared to the past were still significant and positive in the table. In other words, socialization 
is not important in the sample countries, but the subjective evaluation is more important for 
building trust on the core concepts. Table 7 shows the same results for political trust in national 




Table 7. Political trust in national institutions 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  Presidency Government Parliament 
Political 
Parties 
Presidency Government Parliament 
Political 
Parties 






-0.00390 -0.00388 -0.00377 -0.00348 -0.00262 -0.00298 -0.00340 -0.00303 -0.009 -0.000 -0.000 0.009 
(0.00543) (0.00515) (0.00482) (0.00446) (0.00428) (0.00398) (0.00381) (0.00391) 
(0.00380) (0.00334) (0.00286) (0.00296) 
Political 
situation  
    0.272*** 0.322*** 0.277*** 0.213*** 0.225*** 0.283*** 0.249*** 0.198*** 
    (0.0200) (0.0139) (0.0124) (0.0125) (0.0198) (0.0150) (0.0118) (0.0111) 
Economic 
situation 
    0.132*** 0.162*** 0.152*** 0.136*** 0.110*** 0.139*** 0.132*** 0.122*** 




          -0.299 -0.226 -0.271 -0.081 
          (0.509) (0.465) (0.400) (0.432) 
Unemploy-
ment rate 
          -0.033 -0.002 -0.020 0.043 
          (0.0207) (0.0109) (0.0101) (0.00930) 
Inflation 
          0.027 0.042 0.059 0.077** 
          (0.0149) (0.0126) (0.0111) (0.0102) 
Age 
0.00353 -0.00417 -0.00569 -0.00248 0.00779 0.00249 0.00203 0.00239 0.037 -0.051 -0.071 -0.070 
(0.00976) (0.0100) (0.00879) (0.00819) (0.00793) (0.00854) (0.00771) (0.00766) (0.00709) (0.00729) (0.00571) (0.00599) 
Age squared 
0.0000704 0.000129** 0.000127** 0.0000886* 0.0000137 0.0000527 0.0000473 0.0000351 0.052 0.125** 0.131*** 0.115** 
(0.0000547) (0.0000585) (0.0000494) (0.0000443) (0.0000438) (0.0000506) (0.0000448) (0.0000423) (0.0000397) (0.0000425) (0.0000329) (0.0000344) 
Female 
0.0513** 0.0273 0.0174 -0.00202 0.0543*** 0.0318** 0.0193** 0.00115 0.021*** 0.015** 0.010*** 0.004 
(0.0188) (0.0169) (0.0115) (0.0112) (0.0182) (0.0140) (0.00859) (0.00869) (0.0185) (0.0140) (0.00899) (0.00898) 
Religion 
0.0881 0.151** 0.169** 0.182*** 0.0630 0.115*** 0.138*** 0.151*** 0.010 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.029*** 
(0.0758) (0.0642) (0.0613) (0.0565) (0.0600) (0.0410) (0.0416) (0.0432) (0.0555) (0.0298) (0.0275) (0.0325) 
Education 
0.00579 -0.00452 -0.0187 -0.0411** 0.00152 -0.00798 -0.0208 -0.0433*** 0.008 0.005 -0.004 -0.028*** 
(0.0176) (0.0197) (0.0177) (0.0161) (0.0151) (0.0154) (0.0148) (0.0140) (0.0148) (0.0121) (0.0108) (0.0102) 
Health 
0.121*** 0.135*** 0.130*** 0.123*** 0.0675*** 0.0658*** 0.0694*** 0.0699*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.048*** 0.050*** 
(0.0112) (0.0152) (0.0161) (0.0160) (0.0104) (0.00969) (0.0106) (0.00997) (0.0106) (0.00854) (0.00873) (0.00765) 
               
country 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
year 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
               
N 73,772 75,496 74,712 73,382 68,428 70,072 69,476 68,398 66,801 67,484 66,970 66,134 
R-sq 0.226 0.197 0.189 0.135 0.31 0.331 0.303 0.22 0.291 0.292 0.263 0.185 
Note. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses ; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 8. General trust and experience under socialism. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  trust trust trust 
Experience under socialism 0.00204 0.00134 -0.00125 
 (0.00349) (0.00321) (0.00310) 
Political situation   0.111*** 0.116*** 
  (0.00907) (0.00873) 
Economic situation  0.0720*** 0.0637*** 
  (0.00733) (0.00834) 
log (GDP per capita PPP)   -0.648** 
   (0.301) 
Unemployment rate   -0.0295*** 
   (0.00760) 
Inflation   -0.0178*** 
   (0.00541) 
Age -0.00274 0.000707 0.00465 
 (0.00553) (0.00510) (0.00504) 
Age squared 0.0000506* 0.0000215 0.00000303 
 (0.0000293) (0.0000273) (0.0000284) 
Female 0.00953 0.0176 0.0133 
 (0.0109) (0.0111) (0.0109) 
Religion 0.0244 -0.000222 0.00941 
 (0.0256) (0.0233) (0.0236) 
Education 0.0561*** 0.0562*** 0.0574*** 
 (0.00947) (0.00859) (0.00916) 
Health 0.141*** 0.113*** 0.111*** 
 (0.00700) (0.00680) (0.00662) 
    
country dummies yes yes yes 
year dummies yes yes yes 
    
N 75,655 69,598 66,998 
R-sq 0.062 0.089 0.094 
Note. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses ; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 Table 9 is the replication of Table 5 which shows the association of the labor market 
experience with political trust. Other results remain significant while the coefficient for the 
number of years as a self-employer to democracy (column 2), and the number of jobs as an 
employee, ever experienced voluntary job switches to the presidency (column 3), and the 
number of years in state-sector employment to the government (column 4) lost their 




Table 9. Labor market experience during the transition and political trust 









Jobs as an 
employee 
-0.00523 -0.00126 -0.0186 -0.0539*** -0.0540*** -0.0506*** 0.00412 
(0.00498) (0.00567) (0.0148) (0.0117) (0.0124) (0.0131) (0.00967) 
22155 22153 20707 21369 21361 21020 21531 
 0.084 0.084 0.263 0.234 0.22 0.144 0.076 
Number of 
years as a self-
employer 
0.00316** 0.00220  0.000596 0.00344 -0.00284 -0.00395 -0.00383 
(0.00123) (0.00177) (0.00320) (0.00350) (0.00320) (0.00352)  (0.00264)   
22149 22147 20702 21364 21357 21014 21525 
 0.084 0.084 0.263 0.233 0.219 0.143 0.096 
Number of 
moves to a 
better job 
0.00162 0.00626 -0.0196* -0.0161 -0.0173 -0.00289 0.00468 
(0.00410) (0.00584) (0.00980) (0.0169) (0.0131) (0.0103) (0.0151) 
3194 3192 3030 3112 3110 3100 3117 
 0.089 0.102 0.204 0.185 0.179 0.108 0.068 
Number of 
moves to a 
worse job 
-0.000148 -0.000790 -0.00663 -0.00598 -0.00769 -0.00645 0.00274 
(0.00216) (0.00300) (0.00674) (0.00628) (0.00598) (0.00520) (0.00454) 
3274 3274 3120 3183 3177 3167 3191 





0.0164 0.00581 -0.0521 -0.0204 0.00956 -0.0165 0.0252 
(0.0142) (0.0115) (0.0311) (0.0286) (0.0274) (0.0277) (0.0254) 
10475 10473 9826 10110 10115 9984 10225 





-0.0224** -0.00372 0.0171 -0.0302 -0.0488** -0.0385 -0.0603** 
(0.0107) (0.0110) (0.0285) (0.0258)  (0.0246) (0.0277) (0.0275) 
10283 10281 9640 9921 9926 9802 10038 





0.000503 0.00149** 0.00154 0.00251 0.00204 0.000513 0.00436** 
(0.000807) (0.000642) (0.00171) (0.00180) (0.00192) (0.00156) (0.00178))  
22155 22153 20707 21369 21361 21020 21531 







-0.00333 -0.00415 -0.00654 0.000865 -0.00527 0.00865 0.000205 
(0.00432) (0.00520) (0.00911) (0.0113) (0.0127) (0.00874) (0.00996)) 
3174 3173 3025 3077 3075 3071 3070 
0.086 0.104 0.155 0.179 0.165 0.093 0.099 
Note. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses ; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each regression is a separate 
regression, and only the coefficient of labor market experience is shown. Other independent variables include perception of 





By utilizing a comprehensive dataset in the transition countries, this research attempted 
to test two competing theories in the origin of political and general trust: socialization and 
institutional theories. The transition from the post-socialist countries have two important 
dimensions: political (from communism to democracy) and economic (from a centrally-
planned economy to a market economy) aspects. The discrepancy in socio-economic 
institutions before and after the transition gave a research opportunity to test the formulation 
of political trust. This chapter aimed to contribute to the previous literature by employing two 
layers of political trust (the approval of the core system and confidence in national institutions) 
as well as interpersonal trust to test the impact of the legacy of communism.  
Political trust or confidence is citizens’ feelings towards their government, and it is a 
very complex concept as it is domain-specific and dynamic in nature. This chapter focused on 
the importance of the labor market experience in everyday life during the transition. The 
citizens in the consolidation period of the transition might have determined their level of 
political trust through their success or difficulties in participating in the labor market under the 
new institutions. The hands-on transition experience might have influenced their evaluation of 
government performance, shifting the trust for the government. The inclusion of the labor 
market experience to the discourse of political trust was another contribution of this chapter in 
understanding the formulation of political trust.  
 This research supports that the experience under socialism was significantly correlated 
with political trust. For the preference for the core concepts (democracy and a market economy), 
the experience under socialism was negatively correlated. This implies that more experience 
under the communist rule made people resist against a new regime after the transition. The 
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number of years under communism was also negatively correlated with national institutions, 
such as presidency, government, parliament, and political parties. However, it became 
insignificant when macroeconomic variables were added. This means that the social and 
economic environment represented by macroeconomic variables were more important than the 
socialization theory.  
The labor market experience in the transition period was investigated as a possible 
mechanism of governments’ performance evaluation at the individual level. Consequently, the 
result showed that the job market experience was closely correlated with political trust. While 
the number of years as a self-employer and the number of years in the state-sector employment 
were positively correlated with political and general trust, the number of jobs as an employee, 
the number of moves to a better job, and the voluntary or involuntary job switches were 
negatively correlated. It reflects that individual heterogeneity in work-history influenced 
political support as well as general trust.  
 The conclusion of this research does not merely apply to the post-communist countries 
during the transition. Nevertheless, the result of this chapter shows that the macroeconomic 
performance of national government is important while socialization affects political trust. Also, 
the result indicates that the governments should make efforts to secure employment in turbulent 
times. All in all, the results give a message to any modern society that is going through 
institutional changes or/and economic vulnerability of the role of government to secure its 
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Chapter 2. Gender wage gap in times of crisis of the Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) transition countries 
At the early stage of the financial crisis (from 2008 to 2010), the gender wage gap significantly 
decreased in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. The economic crisis made an 
impact on the gender wage gap as the industrial trend affected individuals differently by their 
genders. This chapter aims to investigate the change in the gender wage gap in the European 
transition countries based on the theory of female labor market outcome along with business 
cycle and industry. Specifically, this research examines the role of gender segregation and its 
heterogeneity among females. The outcome of this study suggests that gender segregation in 
the service sector gives a protective role in times of the economic recession at the end of the 
2000s, and the relatively less-educated female group (non-tertiary level) who lost jobs in 
manufacturing found increased share in the retail trade and other service sectors.  
Keywords: gender pay gap, gender segregation, economic recession, service industry 
2.1. Introduction 
 Since the early 1990s, post-communist countries have experienced dramatic political, 
social, and economic changes. On the path to adopting a market economy and relevant 
institutions, such as privatization, enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade system, 
and financial sectors (The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD], 1994), 
transition countries witnessed boom-bust cycles for almost 30 years. Following the initial 
stabilization and economic turmoil period (1990s) and economic boom (2000s), the countries 
went through an economic crisis from 2008 to 2013 due to external financial shocks as well as 
the absence of strong market institutions (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2014). While 
the economic crisis had many aspects, one of the key highlighted features was that the impact 
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of the crisis was deeply gendered as the economic sectors were considerably gender-typed on 
the demand side, and there was a certain degree of income roles of males and females on the 
supply side (European Commission, 2013). 
 This chapter aims to study changes of female labor market outcome (employment and 
wage) before and after the economic recession in the late 2000s. The gender wage gap in fact 
decreased sharply during the crisis by an amount of two percentage point (from 14 percent to 
12 percent); therefore, transition countries’ experience in the recession leaves several 
interesting research questions. First is the source of the decreasing gender wage gap. 
Theoretically, female performance in the job market is affected by occupational segregation, 
individual workers’ commitment, and government and social supports (Rubery & Rafferty, 
2013). This study focuses on short-term changes of female labor market outcome along with 
the business cycle, and thus mainly investigates occupational segregation since the other two 
factors do not fluctuate in the short period of time. Specifically, this research aims to examine 
whether occupational gender segregation protects female employment and wages through a 
descriptive study and a shift-share analysis. 
 Second is gender heterogeneity in the labor market during the economic crisis. For this 
purpose, a decompose approach is used for age, education, and other work characteristics. 
Previous studies which investigated the impact of the Great Recession either treated a female 
group as a homogenous one (Cho & Newhouse, 2013) or decomposed by wage quantile and 
educational level (Perugini & Pompei, 2017). In this study, the quantile gap measure approach 
is used, analyzing within-female heterogeneity between 90th, 50th, and 10th quantiles with an 
industrial division.  
 Moreover, this study aims to add values to existing literature on female employment 
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by emphasizing the role of industries in determining employment and wage at times of 
economic crises. Specifically, this study examines the effects of the expanding service sector 
on female workers in the context of transition countries.  
2.2. Three factors of the gender wage gap: education, industry, economic crisis 
2.2.1. Gender wage gap and education as a human capital 
 One of the importantly observed factors of human capital characteristics is educational 
attainment. In advanced countries, the gender difference in education is reversed, and its role 
as a determinant of the gender wage gap has been diminished since the 2010s (Blau & Kahn, 
2017). Female educational attainment is supported by the development of birth control pills,  
which lowers the cost of long-term investment in professional education and reinforcement of 
anti-discrimination legislation in the area of education, such as Title IX in the U.S. (Goldin & 
Katz, 2002). However, females are often underrepresented in science, technology, engineering, 
and mathematics (STEM), and it can be due to the pre-college environment and discrimination 
rather than the biological difference (Ceci et al., 2014). Nollenberger et al. (2016) argue that a 
gender-equal culture can create a positive effect on girls’ math performance following their 
analysis using the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) in 35 different 
countries.  
 Furthermore, female educational attainment has a positive impact on the labor 
participation rate. In fact, as the demand for educated and skilled workers increased, the labor 
allocation of college graduates and females rose between 1960s and 1980s (Katz & Murphy, 
1992). As a result, educated females experienced an increase in real wage than the less educated. 
Moreover, it was revealed that highly educated females tend to marry males with the equivalent 
education level, and this led to a relatively faster growth in the labor participation rate of highly 
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educated couples than others (Blau, 1998). Recent literature even state that there is a growing 
proportion of females who earn more than their husbands, and they argue that it is not solely 
driven by male unemployment (Van Bavel et al., 2016). Despite the trend, there shows 
compelling evidence indicating that gender identity norms (Bertrand et al., 2015) and the role 
of parenthood are important factors in explaining the gender pay gap (Angelov et al., 2016). 
 In the early transition period (early 1990s), returns to educational attainment rapidly 
increased for both genders. The increase was higher for males (75 to 117 percent) than females 
(23 to 84 percent), and for general secondary schools and tertiary education than vocational 
schools (Boeri & Terrell, 2002). In the context of Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries, such a trend indicates a regional divergence. The substantial decrease in female 
relative wages was offset by the return to education and skills as well as a decline in gender 
discrimination. However, a decrease in real wages of women was observed in Russia and 
Ukraine (Brainerd, 2000). A recent survey on the transition countries reported that the years of 
education was high for both boys and girls (EBRD, 2017), and it was also revealed that the 
percentage of female tertiary education level was higher than males in Russia and Central and 
Eastern European and Baltic (CEB) countries. The survey addressed that the education of girls 
is limited in some countries due to cultural and social norms, such as marriage at an early age. 
2.2.2. Gender wage gap and the service industry 
 While the gender education gap has reduced, gender differentials in industries and 
workplaces remain salient concerning the gender wage gap (Blau & Kahn, 2017). According 
to Blau and Kahn (2017), females have reduced their overrepresentation in administrative 
support and service jobs and increased their probability to work in male-predominant areas, 
such as science, law, and medicine professions. However, occupational segregation continues 
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to have significant effects on the gender wage gap particularly in the U.S. Blau et al. (2013) 
found that heterogeneity exists in decreasing occupational segregation by education, and the 
biggest progress was made by college-level educated females. They observed only little 
changes among the less educated. Despite the fact that highly educated females entered high-
ranking occupations, they are often encountered a glass ceiling which means higher wage 
differentials between males and females at the top of the wage distribution even when 
controlling for education, age, and other labor market characteristics (Albrecht, et al., 2003). 
Such evidence of glass ceiling effects is also found across European countries (Arulampalam 
et al., 2007) including Spain (de la Rica et al., 2008). By educational attainment level, de la 
Rica et al. (2008) found that the gap increases along with the wage distribution for workers 
with college (or tertiary) education (glass ceiling) while the gap decreases for less educated 
(primary or secondary) groups (floor patterns). For the post-communist countries, Ganguli and 
Terrell (2005) found a persistent glass ceiling effect during transitions (1986, 1991, 2003) from 
the analysis of the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS).  
 Explanations for glass ceiling effects vary from traditional labor market discrimination 
(Cotter et al., 2001) to recent non-market factors, such as psychological attributes and demand 
for flexibility (Bertrand, 2018). According to Cotter et al. (2001), glass ceiling effects imply a 
specific type of labor market discrimination, which makes the inequality at the higher level of 
outcome, and the differences increase as one moves up the work hierarchy. It is also supported 
by previous researches who studied female workers’ experience of discrimination in academic 
hierarchies (Knights & Richards, 2003), business (Roth, 2006), as well as science and 
engineering (Tang, 1997). Recently, alternative explanations for the glass ceiling have been 
discussed while discrimination and sexism still exist in the workplace (Bertrand, 2018). For 
example, Croson and Gneezy (2009) stated that female workers are more likely to be risk-
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averse and less prone to competition than male workers, increasing their unwillingness to take 
risks for high earnings in competitive settings (Bertrand, 2018). Another explanation concerns 
the demand for flexibility. Cortés and Pan (2019) found that while highly educated and skilled 
women benefit from increasing substitutes for household work, they still face constraints due 
to overwork and a lack of flexibility in working time. 
 When it comes to the service industry, expansion is argued to be beneficial to overcome 
the glass ceiling as it provides more jobs with women’s psychological comparative advantage 
and increases substitutes for household production (Ngai & Petrongolo, 2017). Therefore, 
expansion in the service industry is an important factor to increase a relative demand for female 
workers. Ngai and Petrongolo (2017) argue that the process of structural transformation (the 
labor reallocation from goods to service industries) and the marketization of home production 
increased female market hours and relative wages. Aligned with the theoretical framework, the 
study by Bridgman et al. (2018) provides empirical evidence of rising marketization (decrease 
in average household hours per working-age population) and acceleration of a structural change 
(increase in hours in producing services) as GDP per capita increases. Moreover, in their  
comparative case study of the U.S. and European Union member states, Freeman and Schettkat 
(2005) revealed that the level of the substitution of traditional home production (food 
preparation, family care, cleaning, etc.) was higher in the U.S. than the EU; therefore, it 
contributed to an increase in female time worked in the U.S. relative to the EU.  
 In the pre-transition period, females of the CEE and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) countries, were under a considerable amount of pressure, burdened 
with work and housework due to a lack of services and modern appliances (Brainerd, 2000). 
After the transition, the post-communist countries pursued a deindustrialization process and 
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observed a decline in agriculture, mining, and manufacturing industries. This led to an increase 
in gender segregation in employment as males moved to the construction sector, and females 
found work in non-market services, such as public administration or education (EBRD, 2019).  
 At present, the availability or the quality of public services for caring for children, the 
elderly, and other family members is still not sufficient in this region. Females spend three or 
more hours a day on unpaid housework than males, and they often seek part-time, informal, or 
home-based work due to the burden of care-related responsibilities. Evidently, this contributes 
to the widening of the gender wage gap (EBRD, 2019). Saxonberg (2006)’s research on family 
policies in four post-communist countries (the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovak Republic, and 
Hungary) supports that the direction of the family policies is familist (where childbearing costs 
and childcare are considered as family responsibilities) and discourages women from staying 
in the labor market. Saxonberg further argues that the existing family policies are the interplay 
of the legacy of communism (ideology, economy, and institutions) and the current shifts in 
economic, social, and political values. 
2.2.3. The impact of the 2008 economic crisis on the gender wage gap 
 Rubery and Ratterty (2013) emphasized three factors in explaining female behavior as 
a flexible condition over the business cycle: gender segregation patterns along with 
employment changes, female commitment to labor market participation, and social support for 
female employment. The 2008 financial crisis gives an opportunity to empirically explore 
relevant theories in the context of gender equality achievements of today.  
 The European Commission (2013) reported that the impact of the 2008 economic crisis 
was deeply gendered. It was concluded that the gender gaps in the labor market (i.e., 
employment, unemployment, wages, and poverty) subsequently decreased mainly due to the 
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pervasive unemployment and lowered wages for both genders. Gender segregation in the labor 
market not only sheltered female jobs in the early years of the crisis, but it also encouraged 
females to behave similar to that of males instead of considering themselves as employment 
buffers.  
 However, the subsequent austerity policies reduced welfare provisions for both 
genders. For example, health and care related cash transfers declined, resulting in a 
disproportionate impact on females. Cho and Newhouse (2013) studied middle-income 
countries to see the effects of the crisis on developing countries and found that it had more 
detrimental impact on males (whose employment was concentrated in hard-hit industries). 
Little support was found for the added-worker effect on females.  
2.3. Data and Methods 
 This paper consists of descriptive investigation and an empirical analysis on the gender 
wage gap associated with education and industry before and after the financial crisis of 2008, 
which had a huge impact on the labor market in the post-communist European countries (IMF, 
2014). For the descriptive study, the shift-share analysis was applied to draw a comparison 
between predicted values calculated on the share of the baseline (year 2007 and 2008) and 
actual changes (year 2010). As the main research question in this study centers on the gender 
wage gap in the European transition countries, the analysis investigated the changes in the 
predicted and actual female shares in different industries (the European classification of 
economic activities, NACE 2.0). Also, for the detailed labor market data observation, the 
change in employment and earnings was investigated at both micro and macro levels.  




· Gender pay gap in unadjusted form by NACE Rev. 2 activity-based on the structure of 
earnings survey methodology (Eurostat) 
· Structure of earnings survey: hourly earnings (Eurostat) 
· Employment in industry/services (World Bank database) 
Micro data 
· European Union statistics on income and living conditions (EU-SILC) 
 The EU-SILC is cross-sectional and longitudinal microdata on income, poverty, social 
exclusion, and living conditions of the EU member states. This study relied on the 2007 and 
2010 cross-sectional samples of ten post-communist countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovak Republic). The 
main advantage of this data set was its harmonized questions and answers for the member 
countries, which enabled the cross-country analysis. The sample was limited to employees aged 
between 16 and 64. The summary statistics are reported in Table 1.  
Table 1. Summary statistics of EU-SILC dataset (year 2007, 2010) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age 135,481 41.31 11.05 17 64 
Age squared 135,481 1,828.35 911.53 289 4096 
Female 135,479 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Primary education 135,481 0.02 0.13 0 1 
Secondary education 135,481 0.68 0.46 0 1 
Tertiary education 135,481 0.30 0.46 0 1 
log(hourly wage) 131,178 1.18 0.75 -6.71 5.38 
Fulltime 135,481 0.96 0.20 0 1 
Part-time 135,481 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Temporary contract 119,723 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Permanent contract 119,723 0.88 0.33 0 1 
Agriculture 134,324 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Industry 134,324 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Construction 134,324 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Trade 134,324 0.13 0.34 0 1 
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Accommodation 134,324 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Transport 134,324 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Financial service 134,324 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Business service 134,324 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Public administration 134,324 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Education 134,324 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Health 134,324 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Other service 134,324 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Bulgaria 135,481 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Czech Republic 135,481 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Estonia 135,481 0.08 0.26 0 1 
Hungary 135,481 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Lithuania 135,481 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Latvia 135,481 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Poland 135,481 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Romania 135,481 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Slovenia 135,481 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Slovak Republic 135,481 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Year 2007 135,481 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Year 2010 135,481 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Note. Retrieved from the EU-SILC data set 
 
 The empirical model of this research adopted a modified model from Perugini and 
Pompei (2017) as follows. 
𝑙ℎ𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑐 =  𝛽𝑜 +  𝛽1𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟07 + 𝛽2𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟10






+ 𝑋′𝑖𝑐,𝑛𝛾𝑛 + 𝑢𝑐 + 𝑢𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐 
 𝑙ℎ𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑐  represents the log of hourly wage of individual (i) of country (c). To 
investigate changes in female income, two interaction terms ( 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟07  and 
𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟10) were included. The comparison group of the terms are male workers in a 
pooled (by country and by year) sample. The fourth and fifth regression represents female 
income by country before and after the crisis. Industries were classified into three categories: 
goods (agriculture, industry, and construction), business services (trade, accommodation, 
transport, real estate, science and technology, and other professional business services), and 
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other services (education, health, arts, and others). The vector of individual and job 
characteristics (X’) included marital status, working hours (fulltime, part-time), contractual 
types (permanent, temporary), and occupation. The model also controlled country and time 
(𝑢𝑐 ,  𝑢𝑦) using the fixed-effects (FE) methods. 𝜀𝑖𝑐 is an error term. 
2.4. Labor market outcome and the gender wage gap during the 2008 financial crisis 
2.4.1 Industrial changes in the labor market from macro and micro data 
 To compare changes in the labor market before and after the financial crisis, this paper 
descriptively observed the worker characteristics by gender (Table 2). The overall trend found 
in the data shows that the age of workers increased around 1.2 years possibly due to great 
employment dislocations of young workers (Cho & Newhouse, 2013). By education, workers 
with secondary education lost their shares (especially female workers) while highly educated 
workers with tertiary education increased their shares. The number of full-time workers 
decreased slightly whereas the number of part-timers increased although most of the workers 
in this data set reported that they were working full time (97 percent for males and 94 percent 
for females). By contrast, temporary workers lost their shares in work while permanent workers 
gained their shares up to 89 percent.  
 By occupation, while professional jobs (legislators, professionals, and technicians) 
slightly increased their shares, workers in craft, plant, and machine operation as well as 
elementary occupations experienced a drop in their shares. By industry, a notable decrease in 
employment share was observed in industrial sectors especially for females. Additional 
declines occurred in the construction, transportation, and other service sectors while the 
business services, public administration, and education sectors experienced a slight increase. 
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Table 2. Worker characteristics from micro data 
Variable 
Year 2007 Year 2010 Difference 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 




Primary 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.01  0.00  
Secondary 0.75 0.64 0.74 0.61 -0.01  -0.03  
Tertiary 0.22 0.35 0.24 0.38 0.02  0.04  
Type of 
employment 
Full-time 0.98 0.94 0.97 0.94 -0.01  -0.01  
Part-time 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.01  0.01  
Type of 
contract 
Temporary 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.11 -0.03  -0.02  
Permanent 0.86 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.03  0.02  
Occupation 
Legislators, senior 
officials and managers 
0.06 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.01  0.01  
Professionals 0.10 0.18 0.11 0.21 0.01  0.02  
Technicians and 
associate professionals 
0.12 0.20 0.13 0.21 0.01  0.01  
Clerks 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.12 0.00  0.00  
Service workers and 
shop and market sales 
workers 
0.08 0.18 0.09 0.18 0.01  0.00  
Skilled agricultural and 
fishery workers 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00  0.00  
Craft and related trades 
workers 
0.29 0.07 0.26 0.05 -0.03  -0.02  
Plant and machine 
operators and 
assemblers 
0.20 0.07 0.19 0.06 -0.01  -0.01  
Elementary 
occupations 
0.09 0.12 0.09 0.12 -0.01  -0.01  
Armed forces 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00  
Industry 
Agriculture 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.00  0.00  
Industry 0.35 0.24 0.33 0.20 -0.02  -0.04  
Construction 0.15 0.02 0.14 0.02 -0.01  0.00  
Trade 0.10 0.16 0.11 0.17 0.00  0.01  
Accommodation 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.00  0.00  
Transport 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.04 -0.01  -0.01  
Financial service 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.00  0.00  
Business service 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.03  0.03  
Public administration 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.01  0.01  
Education 0.03 0.15 0.04 0.16 0.00  0.01  
Health 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.00  0.00  
Other service 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.01  -0.01  
Note. Author’s calculation from the EU-SILC data set 
 Table 3 also presents evidence that the average differences in wage by gender 
decreased from 0.15 to 0.12 log wage level. The decomposition table also gives a clue that both 
the explained and unexplained parts in each independent variable has decreased (for the 
explained: from -0.09 to -0.10; for the unexplained: from 0.24 to 0.21). The impact of industry 
62 
 
was negative for both the explained and unexplained parts, and the magnitude increased. From 
the decomposition, it can be assumed that the industry factor resulted in a positive impact on 
the decrease in the average gender wage gap. 
Table 3. Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of average gender wage gap 






Differential   
Prediction_1 1.044*** 1.256*** 
 (0.00395) (0.00401) 
Prediction_2 0.890*** 1.139*** 
 (0.00415) (0.00400) 
Difference 0.154*** 0.117*** 
  (0.00573) (0.00566) 
   
Explained   
Age -0.0109*** -0.0116*** 
 (0.000697) (0.000726) 
Education -0.0458*** -0.0503*** 
 (0.00161) (0.00166) 
Part-time -0.000811 -0.00211*** 
 (0.000552) (0.000537) 
Temporary -0.00168*** -0.000228 
 (0.000392) (0.000179) 
Industry -0.0282*** -0.0320*** 
 (0.00262) (0.00268) 
Total -0.0875*** -0.0963*** 
  (0.00323) (0.00325) 
   
Unexplained   
Age 0.247*** 0.215*** 
 (0.0727) (0.0756) 
Education 0.00515 -0.0142 
 (0.0402) (0.0423) 
Part-time -0.00268** -0.00340*** 
 (0.00122) (0.00123) 
Temporary -0.0125*** -0.00558*** 
 (0.00211) (0.00182) 
Industry -0.0931*** -0.123*** 
 (0.00857) (0.00895) 
Constant 0.0977 0.144 
 (0.0845) (0.0878) 
Total 0.242*** 0.213*** 
 (0.00598) (0.00594) 
      
Observation 57,944 57,566 
Note. Author’s calculation from the EU-SILC data set. 




 Table 4 shows the association among work characteristics with a log of hourly wage 
before and after the economic recession. The magnitude of the age variable increased in the 
same positive direction, and it is also presumably due to the exit of young workers from the 
labor market (Cho & Newhouse, 2013). Moreover, the decrease in the coefficient to the female 
dummy leaves a significant implication of this paper’s main research question. The education 
variable compared to the omitted primary education variable was more important. In addition, 
being a part-timer was positively associated with the wage while being a temporary worker 
showed a negative association. This result possibly reflects the fact that the contractual status 
was still important while the number of highly paid part-timers increased. The industrial sectors, 
ranging from agriculture to other services were compared with the omitted industry sector 
including manufacturing. The direction of the association between the industry dummy and log 
of wage did not change although the magnitude was slightly differentiated. The three-year term 
(between 2007 and 2010) was a relatively short period to reflect the labor market turbulences 
from the economic crisis to hourly wage. Therefore, this paper moved on to the employment 
change in each industrial sector using the macro data set, such as the structure of earnings 
survey and the World Bank database.  
Table 4. Determinants of log hourly wage from micro data 
 Worker’s characteristics 
year 2007 year 2010 
log(wage) log(wage) 
Age 0.0369*** 0.0417*** 
 (0.00188) (0.00190) 
Age squared -0.000415*** -0.000460*** 
  (0.0000228) (0.0000225) 
Female -0.242*** -0.213*** 
  (0.00589) (0.00587) 
Secondary education 0.125*** 0.192*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0232) 
Tertiary education 0.487*** 0.548*** 
  (0.0208) (0.0236) 
Part-time 0.0246* 0.0598*** 
  (0.0143) (0.0133) 
Temporary -0.139*** -0.0703*** 
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 Worker’s characteristics 
year 2007 year 2010 
log(wage) log(wage) 
  (0.00845) (0.00908) 
Agriculture -0.203*** -0.262*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0156) 
Construction -0.0347*** -0.0896*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0108) 
Trade -0.120*** -0.129*** 
 (0.00911) (0.00899) 
Accommodation -0.145*** -0.148*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0158) 
Transport 0.0247** 0.0310*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0112) 
Financial service 0.424*** 0.364*** 
 (0.0199) (0.0187) 
Business service 0.121*** 0.0913*** 
 (0.0131) (0.0110) 
Public administration 0.180*** 0.139*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0104) 
Education 0.147*** 0.130*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0106) 
Health 0.0397*** 0.0566*** 
 (0.0120) (0.0119) 
Other service -0.0588*** -0.0732*** 
  (0.0144) (0.0168) 
constant 0.0918** 0.113** 
  (0.0423) (0.0450) 
Observation 57,944 57,566 
R-squared 0.136 0.132 
Note. Author’s calculation from the EU-SILC dataset.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 Unlike the wage, the sector share of employment and female intensity among the total 
employment showed a drastic change by industry. Most of the transition countries experienced 
a decline in the number of employees in the industry and service sectors except Poland, which 
was the only country whose number of employees grew during the early stage of the economic 
recession (Table 5). In the service sector, some countries (Bulgaria, Latvia, Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic) observed an expansion of business services during the crisis. 
Lastly, the service activities other than the business service shrank during the early years of the 




Table 5. Change in employment (2006-2010) from macro data 
(Unit: 1,000) 
 Industry, construction and services 
(except public administration, defense, 
compulsory social security) 




(2006-2010) 2006 2010 
Change 
(2006-2010) 
Number Percent Number Percent 
BG 1,826 1,701 -125 -6.8 847 690 -156 -18.4 
CZ 3,554 3,162 -392 -11.0 1,669 1,393 -276 -16.5 
EE 406 351 -56 -13.8 153 114 -39 -25.5 
HU 728 536 -192 -26.4 210 142 -69 -32.9 
LT 1,006 870 -136 -13.5 366 252 -114 -31.1 
LV 1,985 1,787 -198 -10.0 696 641 -55 -7.9 
PL 6,600 6,935 335 5.1 2,624 2,707 83 3.2 
RO 4,065 3,666 -399 -9.8 2,079 1,557 -522 -25.1 
SI 556 528 -28 -5.0 253 214 -39 -15.4 
SK 1,584 1,461 -123 -7.8 687 550 -137 -19.9 
Total 2,231 2,100 -131 -5.9 958 826 -132 -13.8 
 Services of the business economy 
Education; human health and social work 
activities; arts, entertainment and 
recreation; other service activities 
 2006 2010 
Change 
(2006-2010) 2006 2010 
Change 
(2006-2010) 
Number Percent Number Percent 
BG 583 694 111 19.0 396 316 -79 -19.9 
CZ 1,258 1,185 -73 -5.8 626 584 -42 -6.7 
EE 148 140 -8 -5.4 105 97 -8 -7.6 
HU 317 231 -86 -27.1 200 163 -37 -18.5 
LT 351 347 -4 -1.1 289 271 -19 -6.6 
LV 713 735 21 2.9 575 411 -164 -28.5 
PL 2,247 2,530 284 12.6 1,729 1,698 -32 -1.9 
RO 1,217 1,365 148 12.2 769 744 -25 -3.3 
SI 185 200 15 8.1 118 113 -4 -3.4 
SK 519 598 79 15.2 379 313 -65 -17.2 
Total 754 802 49 6.5 519 471 -48 -9.2 
Note. Structure of earnings survey (year 2006, 2010), hourly earnings. Retrieved from Eurostat. 
 The sector share of employment and female intensity among the total employment 
showed a decreasing pattern of industry share as well as the increasing intensity of the service 
sector (Table 6). Overall, three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) showed the largest 
reduction in industry and high increase in services (sector share of employment). Following 




Table 6. Sector share of employment and female intensity from macro data 
Country Sector 
Sector Share of Employment Female Intensity 
2007 2010 Change 2007 2010 Change 
BG 
Industry 35.5 33.0 -2.5 28.5 24.1 -4.4 
Service 57.0 60.2 3.3 65.9 70.7 4.9 
CZ 
Industry 40.2 38.0 -2.2 26.8 23.2 -3.6 
Service 56.2 58.9 2.7 70.7 74.9 4.2 
EE 
Industry 35.1 30.3 -4.8 21.8 18.0 -3.8 
Service 60.1 65.5 5.4 75.1 79.2 4.1 
HU 
Industry 32.5 30.7 -1.8 21.1 19.8 -1.3 
Service 62.9 64.8 1.9 76.6 77.9 1.3 
LT 
Industry 30.5 24.6 -6.0 19.7 16.6 -3.1 
Service 58.1 66.6 8.5 71.7 76.9 5.2 
LV 
Industry 28.6 23.1 -5.6 15.5 13.6 -1.9 
Service 61.2 68.3 7.1 76.7 80.7 4.0 
PL 
Industry 30.7 30.3 -0.4 17.8 16.1 -1.7 
Service 54.5 56.6 2.1 68.0 71.2 3.2 
RO 
Industry 31.4 28.3 -3.1 24.7 19.9 -4.8 
Service 39.1 40.7 1.6 44.3 47.7 3.4 
SI 
Industry 35.2 32.6 -2.7 23.0 20.5 -2.4 
Service 54.9 58.6 3.7 66.8 70.9 4.1 
SK 
Industry 39.4 37.1 -2.3 24.3 21.1 -3.2 
Service 56.4 59.7 3.2 73.5 77.1 3.7 
Average 
Industry 33.9 30.8 -3.1 22.3 19.3 -3.0 
Service 56.0 60.0 3.9 68.9 72.7 3.8 
Note. Employment in industry/services (% of total employment) (modeled ILO estimate) for the sector share of 
employment, and Employment in industry/services, female (% of female employment) (modeled ILO estimate) 
for the female intensity. Retrieved from World Bank database. 
2.4.2. Change in the gender wage gap among industries 
 The transition countries in Europe experienced a stronger decrease in the gender pay 
gap than other European countries. In the early stages of the financial crisis (from 2008 to 











Note. (European Union 27 countries) Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK; (Transition 10 
countries) Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia; 
(Gender pay gap) The unadjusted gender pay gap (GPG) represents the difference between average gross hourly 
earnings of male paid employees and of female paid employees as a percentage of average gross hourly earnings 
of male paid employees. Retrieved from Gender pay gap in unadjusted form by NACE Rev. 2 activity - structure 
of earnings survey methodology, Eurostat. 
 
 By industry, the industry and construction sectors (including construction and 
manufacturing) experienced the most significant decrease in the gender wage gap – around 
three percentage points. The overall decline in the gender wage gap from 2008 to 2017 largely 
resulted from the reduction in this period. The service sectors (both business services and others) 









2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Gender pay gap in unadjusted form: Industry, construction and services 
(except public administration, defense, compulsory social security)
European Union - 27 countries Transition countries - 10 countries
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2008-2017 2008-2010 2010-2013 2013-2017 
Industry and construction 
Mining and quarrying -6.2 
-5.5 0.2 -1.0 
Construction -3.1 
-3.7 1.2 -0.6 
Manufacturing -4.2 
-2.0 -0.4 -1.8 
Water supply; sewerage, waste management and 
remediation activities 
-0.5 -3.3 1.8 0.9 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply -5.0 
-0.6 -3.0 -1.4 
Average -3.8 -3.0 0.0 -0.8 
Services of the business economy 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles 
-1.4 -1.9 -0.4 1.0 
Accommodation and food service activities -4.8 
-1.9 -3.2 0.3 
Transportation and storage -7.2 
-1.9 -4.6 -0.8 
Financial and insurance activities -3.4 
-1.0 -0.5 -1.8 
Information and communication 0.5 -0.8 1.6 -0.3 
Real estate activities 0.2 
2.3 -1.4 -0.7 
Administrative and support service activities -12.2 
-9.4 -0.9 -1.8 
Professional, scientific and technical activities -2.9 
-2.3 0.3 -0.9 
Average -3.9 -2.1 -1.1 -0.6 
Education; human health and social work activities; arts, entertainment and recreation; other service 
activities 
Arts, entertainment and recreation -1.2 
-3.9 2.1 0.7 
Education -1.8 
-1.2 2.5 -3.1 
Human health and social work activities -0.2 
-0.7 1.5 -1.0 
Other service activities -4.3 
2.4 -4.7 -2.0 
Average -1.9 -0.9 0.4 -1.4 
Note. Countries: 10 transition countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia). Retrieved from gender pay gap in unadjusted form by NACE Rev. 2 activity - 




 Using the EU-SILC data set, this study descriptively observed the change in the gender 
wage gap by country (Table 8). The Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) 
experienced the most significant decrease in the gender wage gap in the early period of the 
economic crisis (2007-2010). On the contrary, most of the CEE countries experienced a 
moderate reduction in the gender wage gap, except for Hungary and Slovenia that presented an 
increase in the gender wage gap. 
Table 8. Mean earnings by gender and changes in the gender wage gap (2007-2010) 
 
 








 earning obs earning obs earning obs earning obs 
BG 1.26 1,961 1.05 1,729 16.7 2.18 2,799 1.89 2,608 13.3 -3.4 
CZ 4.35 4,555 3.34 3,850 23.2 5.55 3,997 4.35 3,464 21.6 -1.6 
EE 4.11 2,778 2.93 2,811 28.7 5.36 2,047 4.08 2,331 23.9 -4.8 
HU 3.27 3,716 3.09 3,423 5.5 3.71 3,806 3.38 3,735 8.9 3.4 
LT 3.36 2,283 2.83 2,326 15.8 3.76 1,945 3.65 2,330 2.9 -12.9 
LV 3.02 1,762 2.46 1,977 18.5 4.59 1,967 4.06 2,430 11.5 -7.0 
PL 3.66 5,872 3.49 4,969 4.6 4.16 5,188 3.99 4,624 4.1 -0.5 
RO 1.84 2,916 1.59 2,334 13.6 2.00 2,757 1.78 2,152 11.0 -2.6 
SI 8.35 5,749 7.91 5,084 5.3 10.15 5,533 9.33 5,197 8.1 2.8 
SK 2.97 2,973 2.40 2,862 19.2 4.62 3,176 3.74 3,160 19.0 -0.2 
Total 
(Aver.) 
4.12 34,565 3.61 31,365 12.4 5.05 33,215 4.47 32,031 11.5 -0.9 
Note. Author’s calculation from EU-SILC dataset; only employees are included in the sample, aged between 17 
and 64. Earning is in Euro on hourly basis.  
 
2.4.3. Gender wage gap and segregation by industry 
 To explore gender segregation and its impact on the employment, this paper adopted 
the shift-share analysis by Rubery and Rafferty (2013) to predict female employment in year 
2010 based on the gender share of sectors at 2007 rates (Table 9). If females lose more jobs 
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than expected, than it can be interpreted that females were employed in buffer-type jobs. 
Moreover, if females are employed more than expected, then it can be inferred that gender 
segregation protected their jobs. In that regard, Table 9 indicates that females lost their industry 
and construction sector shares disproportionately from the downturn. If the sector shares 
maintained at 34.7 percent, 136,000 more jobs would have been secured for female workers. It 
is assumed that females were mostly employed in buffer-type jobs in the industry and 
construction sectors.  
 On the contrary, there is evidence that females were protected in the service sectors. 
Females were expected to be employed in the business service sector about 3.7 million females 
if the female share remained at the 2006 level (46.4 %) with 225,000 more jobs created. 
However, 305,000 jobs were actually created, and the gap between the prediction was 80,000 
jobs. In other service sectors, the female sector share increased (from 72.7% to 75.5%), but the 
number of female jobs decreased was about 215,000 as the total employment was reduced. 
However, the number of actual female jobs outnumbered the expected jobs calculated from the 
female share in 2006, and additional 132,000 jobs were created than expected. This result 
indicates that females were protected in overall service jobs.   
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46.4 47.4 1.0  181 305 80 (62.8)* 
Other service 
activities 
72.7 75.5 2.8  -262 -215 132 45.1 
Business 
economy** 





47.5 48.0 0.6  -809 -504 119 38.4 
Note. * Increase in female employment among total employment growth, ** Industry and construction, 
Services of the business economy, *** all except public administration, defense, compulsory social 
security. Retrieved from structure of earnings survey (year) hourly earnings [earn_ses_hourly], Eurostat. 
 
 For detailed observations, this chapter investigated heterogeneity among two 
educational levels (tertiary and non-tertiary levels) (Table 10). In the manufacturing sector, 
non-tertiary female workers were employed for fewer jobs than predicted based on the sector 
share in year 2007. Likewise, non-tertiary females working for the transportation and storage 
sectors had fewer jobs than their tertiary counterparts. Non-tertiary females had more jobs in 
the service sectors, including wholesale and retail trade and others. Tertiary-level educated 
female workers, however, experienced a less significant decline in manufacturing as well as an 
increase in jobs in professional sectors (real estate, science and technology, support service, 
education, health and social work, etc.). As female workers with high education had more 
opportunities in the labor market, it is highly likely that this contributed to the lower gender 
wage gap after the financial crisis.  
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Manufacturing, mining and quarrying and other industry (N: 37,494) 
All 38.5 37.0 -1.5 -1,189 -1,166 -260 49.53 
Tertiary  41.7 40.1 -1.6 42 -56 -50 400.00 
Non-tertiary 37.9 36.3 -1.6 -1,231 -1,110 -224 47.44 
Construction (N: 11,227) 
All 9.1 10.1 1.1 -526 11 58 9.1 
Tertiary  23.4 26.7 3.3 -39 23 27 NA 
Non-tertiary 6.7 7.2 0.5 -487 -12 21 2.4 
Wholesale and retail trade (N: 17,980) 
All 58.7 60.3 1.6  -62 268 147 (130.10) 
Tertiary  60.9 62.1 1.2  29 111 26 (79.29) 
Non-tertiary 58.0 59.7 1.7  -91 157 119 (237.88) 
Transportation and storage (N: 9,766) 
All 29.8 26.9 -2.9  -370 -344 -131 48.18 
Tertiary  43.2 41.5 -1.7  -87 -92 -15 51.40 
Non-tertiary 26.4 23.4 -3.0  -283 -252 -111 47.10 
Real estate, professional, scientific and technical activities, administrative and support service activities 
(N: 8,955) 
All 45.5 46.8 1.3  939 914 70 (49.33) 
Tertiary  47.7 50.2 2.5  390 467 58 (54.49) 
Non-tertiary 44.0 44.3 0.3  549 447 9 (44.88) 
Accommodation and food service activities (N: 4,442) 
All 67.7 67.3 -0.3  36 52 -8 (59.09) 
Tertiary  70.7 72.7 2.0  -5 9 6 (225.00) 
Non-tertiary 67.2 66.5 -0.7  41 43 -13 (51.19) 
        
        











































All 69.8 69.5 -0.3  51 104 -4 (67.10) 
Tertiary  65.4 67.2 1.8  32 105 15 (76.64) 
Non-tertiary 74.7 72.5 -2.2  19 -1 -14 NA 
Education (N: 12,525) 
All 80.4 80.7 0.3  30 227 20 (88.33) 
Tertiary  78.9 79.5 0.6  27 228 27 (89.41) 
Non-tertiary 83.3 83.1 -0.1  3 -1 -3 NA 
Health and social work (N: 8,818) 
All 81.5 84.2 2.7  -106 180 120 (243.24) 
Tertiary  80.9 84.5 3.6  -35 226 71 (118.32) 
Non-tertiary 82.0 84.0 2.0  -71 -46 50 39.32 
Other service (N: 4,531) 
All 53.1 62.8 9.7  -549 -234 182 29.89 
Tertiary 57.0 63.6 6.6  -118 -52 45 30.59 
Non-tertiary 51.2 62.3 11.0  -431 -182 132 29.69 
Note. Author’s calculation from the EU-SILC micro data set 
 
2.4.4. Changes in the gender wage gap within industries along with the wage distribution 
 The results of the empirical analysis are reported in Table 11, which includes both the 
OLS and quantile regression results. The results from the OLS estimation cover all income 
groups while the quantile regression was conducted for three income classifications (10%, 50%, 
and 90%). Table 7 shows the comparison before (year 2007) and after (year 2010) the financial 
crisis in Europe. It is noted that female workers earned significantly lower wages than their 
male counterparts once other determinants to wages were controlled. The overall gender wage 
gap decreased from 0.25 to 0.22 log points (column (1)). The result supports previous literature, 
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which found a decreased gender wage gap during the financial crisis in the transition countries 
(Perugini & Pompei, 2017). 
 Furthermore, married females earned more than other category groups (never married, 
separated, widowed, and divorced), and age was positively correlated with earnings in vertical 
U shape. The positive correlation between marital status and earnings was driven by the middle 
and high income groups. In the U.S., the rising participation rate of married women contributed 
to narrowing the gender wage gap (Goldin, 2006), and the marital status of women in the 
European transition countries was also positively correlated with earnings, provided that they 
belonged to higher than middle income categories.  
Education was also significantly and positively correlated with wages as individuals 
with tertiary education earned 0.32 log points than those with primary education (baseline). 
Interestingly, part-time workers earned slightly more (0.02 log points) than full-time workers. 
This reflects that there were high income part-timers on hourly basis. The premium to education 
(secondary and tertiary) almost doubled for the high income group compared to the lowest 
income group. The impact of the part-time worker status was negatively correlated with income 
for the lower income group, but it turned positive for the high income group. The result 
indicates that the scope of part-time jobs is diverse from low-income jobs to high-income 
(maybe professional) ones. Additionally, temporary jobs were significantly and negatively 
correlated with all income groups, and the negative impact was biggest for the lower-income 
group, which is in line with previous studies (Aleksynska, 2018; Perugini & Pompei, 2017).  
 The columns (1) to (3) show the baseline results from the quantile regression. The 
gender wage gap declined both in the lower (10%) and middle (50%) income groups. In the 
lower income group (10%), females earned 0.17 log points before the crisis, and the number 
75 
 
decreased to 0.12 log points afterwards. Females in the middle income group experienced 
slightly lower wages (0.01 log points) after the crisis. On the contrary, the high income group 
experienced no change in their income. Considering that the gender wage gap reflected the 
employment shock in the crisis (European Commission, 2013), it can be interpreted that the 
lower income male workers were worse off than the females even when undereducated female 
workers (who were supposed to earn less than the highly educated) were treated poorly in the 
labor market.  
 After the baseline regression, this study conducted a quantile regression with industry 
(goods and services) and year dummies to investigate changes in the gender wage gap before 
and after the economic recession by industry type. Overall, the impact of the industry remained 
at the 2007 level (column (5), (9), and (13)), but it showed heterogeneity by industrial 
distinction. First, in the goods industry (column (5) to (8)), female workers in the lower income 
group (10%) became worse off possibly due to decreased employment opportunities in the 
manufacturing sector. Other income groups did not experience lower income after the crisis. 
Second, in the business service sector (column (9) to (12)), the overall gender wage gap slightly 
decreased (0.01 log points), driven by the achievement of female high incomers (column (12)). 
Lastly, in other service sectors, the overall gender wage gap remained the same, but the lower 
income group earned more while the high income group showed fewer income after the crisis.  
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Table 11. Determinants of hourly wages (OLS and quantile regressions, 2007 and 2010) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES OLS q (.10) q (.50) q (.90) OLS q (.10) q (.50) q (.90) 
         
Female*2007 -0.25*** -0.17*** -0.24*** -0.32*** -0.23*** -0.16*** -0.23*** -0.31*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) 
Female*2010 -0.22*** -0.12*** -0.23*** -0.32*** -0.21*** -0.10*** -0.22*** -0.31*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) 
Female*2007*Goods     -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.03** 
     (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.014) 
Female*2010*Goods     -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.03** 
     (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.015)          
Married 0.02*** 0.01 0.02*** 0.02** 0.02*** 0.01 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) 
Age 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Age squared -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Secondary 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.18*** 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.19*** 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.010) (0.019) (0.011) (0.018) (0.011) (0.021) 
Tertiary 0.32*** 0.24*** 0.29*** 0.45*** 0.32*** 0.24*** 0.29*** 0.46*** 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.011) (0.021) (0.012) (0.020) (0.012) (0.023) 
Part-time 0.02* -0.14*** 0.00 0.21*** 0.02* -0.15*** 0.00 0.21*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.022) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.019) 
Temporary -0.17*** -0.23*** -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.17*** -0.23*** -0.16*** -0.12*** 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.010) 
Occupation yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
country dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
year dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
         
Constant 0.01 -0.35*** 0.04 0.41*** 0.00 -0.35*** 0.05* 0.41*** 
 -0.025 (0.041) (0.029) (0.056) (0.025) (0.037) (0.025) (0.050)          
Observations 110,635 110,635 110,635 110,635 110,635 110,635 110,635 110,635 
R-squared 0.515       0.515       
Note. Author’s calculation from the EU-SILC micro data set; (goods) agriculture, industry, and construction, (business service) trade, accommodation, transport, real estate, 




Table 11. Determinants of hourly wages (OLS and quantile regressions, 2007 and 2010) (continued) 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
VARIABLES OLS q (.10) q (.50) q (.90) OLS q (.10) q (.50) q (.90) 
         
Female*2007 -0.24*** -0.16*** -0.24*** -0.32*** -0.24*** -0.18*** -0.24*** -0.30*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) 
Female*2010 -0.22*** -0.11*** -0.22*** -0.33*** -0.22*** -0.13*** -0.22*** -0.29*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.011)          
Female*2007*Business Service -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.01     
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.012)     
Female*2010*Business Service -0.02*** -0.05*** -0.02*** 0.03*     
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.015)     
Female*2007*Other Service     -0.02*** 0.02** -0.01* -0.07*** 
     (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012) 
Female*2010*Other Service     -0.02*** 0.04*** -0.03*** -0.10*** 
     (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.011) 
Married 0.02*** 0.00 0.02*** 0.02** 0.02*** 0.01 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Age 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Age squared -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Secondary 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.18*** 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.18*** 
 (0.011) (0.021) (0.011) (0.021) (0.011) (0.019) (0.009) (0.019) 
Tertiary 0.32*** 0.24*** 0.29*** 0.45*** 0.32*** 0.24*** 0.29*** 0.45*** 
 (0.012) (0.022) (0.012) (0.021) (0.012) (0.019) (0.011) (0.022) 
Part-time 0.02** -0.14*** 0.00 0.22*** 0.02** -0.14*** 0.00 0.22*** 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.020) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.024) 
Temporary -0.17*** -0.23*** -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.17*** -0.23*** -0.16*** -0.12*** 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) 
Occupation yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
country dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
year dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
         
Constant 0.01 -0.35*** 0.05* 0.41*** 0.00 -0.35*** 0.04 0.40*** 
 (0.025) (0.037) (0.025) (0.050) (0.025) (0.036) (0.027) (0.040)          
Observations 110,635 110,635 110,635 110,635 110,635 110,635 110,635 110,635 




 This chapter attempted to investigate the gender wage gap in the transition countries. 
All in all, one could infer that the female workers in the post-communist countries went through 
a unique experience in the labor market. Before the transition, they were encouraged to 
participate in the labor market and given social support – although the actual provision and 
quality were not enough – from the government. As a result, they recorded a better labor market 
participation rate and average wage than their counterparts in the Western countries. The life 
under communism was also featured by dual burden at home and work under the male 
breadwinner social norm and scarce modern appliances. After the transition, they were 
advantaged by increasing returns to education but disadvantaged by rising wage differentials 
as they were likely to be hired in the low-wage service sector.  
 While it was not possible to investigate more of the early transition period labor market 
due to data scarcity, it was worth to review the effect of the economic crisis in the late 2000s 
in the CEE countries and to have examined the gender wage gap and heterogeneity among 
female workers by industries. Although the conditions of the crisis were not equivalent to that 
of the early consolidation period in the 1990s, it gave an opportunity to study the impact of the 
economic crisis and industrial changes in the transition countries.  
After the investigation of the gender wage gap and the impact of industrial patterns 
before and after the economic crisis, this study supports that the gender wage gap decreased 
due to the recession. As the results showed, the number of employees in the industrial sector 
decreased while the service sector was expanded in most of the sample countries. This chapter 
found evidence of the protective role of gender segregation in the service sector as it created 
more job opportunities than expected by the shift-share analysis.  
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By educational level, the non-tertiary level female workers became worse off than their 
tertiary level counterparts in the manufacturing sector, and job vacancies were created in the 
wholesale and retail trade and other service sectors. Furthermore, the quantile regression 
presented evidence that the low income female groups experienced a wage reduction in the 
goods industry, but they earned more in other service sectors. The hourly wage of the high 
income group did not change before and after the crisis, and their wage increased after the crisis 
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Chapter 3. Job satisfaction in post-socialist countries 
This chapter investigates job satisfaction in the context of post-socialist countries as an 
important aspect of subjective well-being in the region. This research starts with building the 
conceptual framework of the impact of transition on job satisfaction through growing 
inequality and socio-psychological factors. Then, it examines the gender-job satisfaction 
paradox in the region by assessing the gender difference in work orientation using two 
comprehensive datasets, the World Value Survey and Life in the Transition Survey. Results 
show that females in the transition countries value the “soft” aspect of work than males do and 
that the increasing inequality after the transition decreased male job satisfaction who value the 
“hard” aspect, such as payment and security. The theoretical framework and the empirical result 
is valuable as it considers the inequality and subjective well-being trend before and after the 
transition while previous literature treated the gender differentials in transition as a time 
constant concept.  
Keywords: job satisfaction, work orientation, transition, gender    
3.1. Introduction 
 Literature on job satisfaction and gender poses an interesting research question, named 
the gender-job satisfaction paradox (Clark, 1997). Although the objective work quality of 
female workers is not as generous as that of males, they often report a higher level of 
satisfaction at work. The traditional explanation of the paradox focuses on the lower 
expectation of females from their job market participation. That is, as females expect less from 
work, they are generally satisfied with their given work quality. Recently, different work 
orientation by gender has empirically supported such argument. While male workers emphasize 
“hard” aspects (payment and job security), females tend to find “soft” aspects of a job (good 
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relations with management) important in determining their level of job satisfaction.  
 In post-socialist countries, job satisfaction has to be understood in the context of 
growing inequality and decreasing job security during the economic consolidation after the 
transition. The transition created a far-reaching change in daily life, and most notably, in their 
work. It brought a soaring unemployment rate, and workers were reallocated from the “old” 
sectors of public enterprises to the “new” private sectors (Boeri & Terrell, 2002). In the pre-
transition period, female workers were encouraged to join the labor market under the socialist 
regime, and they fared better than their counterparts in Western European countries. However, 
the increased wage inequality during the transition suppressed female relative wages (Brainerd, 
2000).  
 This research aims to examine the transition countries’ gender difference in job 
satisfaction in line with work orientation literature. Specifically, this paper investigates three 
research hypotheses with empirical evidences. First, this research tests whether the gender-job 
satisfaction paradox is valid in the transition countries by comparing the level of job 
satisfaction by gender. Second, as job satisfaction is an important dimension of subjective well-
being (SWB), this paper attempts to find a correlation between individual work orientation and 
happiness by gender. Finally, this paper studies whether the gender work orientation was 
systematically changed after the transition.  
3.2. Transition and SWB through an institutional and social-psychological mechanism 
 The analysis of this chapter follows the conceptual framework described in Figure 1, 
which starts from the transitional context (economic hardship and inequality growth) to job 
satisfaction (job orientations, demographic characteristics, and gender difference) and 
subjective well-being through a social-psychological mechanism. The conceptual framework 
85 
 
is developed upon two stream of literature, namely, inequality growth in the transition countries 
and transition happiness gap. First, inequality increased in overall transition countries due to 
the hollowing out of the middle class and widened wage distribution (Milanovic, 1999). Second, 
inequality growth negatively affected individual subjective well-being (Guriev & Zhuravskaya, 
2009), and it was through a social-psychological mechanism, such as preference for equality 
(Sanfey & Teksoz, 2007; Carola & Klasen, 2012), tunnel effect (Senik, 2004; Guriev & 
Zhuravskaya, 2009), and relative income (Easterlin & Plagnol, 2008). More explanation on the 
theories are followed in the rest of the chapter.    
 
Figure 1. From transition to the SWB 
 
Source: author 
3.2.1 Transition and inequality growth: Labor market context 
 After the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, transition 
economies faced a massive economic downturn (GDP falling to 50 to 85 percent level 
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compared to the 1989 level), which is comparable to the Great Depression (Easterlin, 2009). 
The government of each transition economy had to cope with the economic hardship with 
structural reforms to build economic institutions from scratch, but many transition countries 
found themselves stuck in the ‘development trap (economic development is hampered due to 
incapable political institutions)’ (Sonin, 2013). Consequently, the economic and political 
hardship resulted in the ‘transition happiness gap (the difference in the level of life satisfaction 
between transition and non-transition countries when controlling for national-level and 
individual-level explanatory variables)’ specifically due to five sources: an increase in 
inequality, a decrease in public goods, an increase of volatility and uncertainty of earnings, an 
increase in aspiration levels, and a depreciation of human capital accumulated before the 
transition (Guriev & Zhuravskaya, 2009). Almost thirty years after the transition, recent 
literature found evidence that the happiness gap has been converged, and the five factors have 
been subsided driven by the next generation (middle-income young population) (Guriev & 
Melnikov, 2018).  
 The five factors of the transition happiness gap are primarily associated with the labor 
market and human capital. Growing inequality, the first and the foremost factor of the happiness 
gap, has been accelerated by the structural change of the labor market in the new capitalist 
economies. According to Milanovic (1999), one of the important characteristics of the labor 
market is the removal of legal restrictions on the private sector. As a result, the labor market 
players were transformed from a two-tier (composed of a small private sector and a large state 
sector) to a three-tier (a private sector, capitalists, and a state sector) structure. The economic 
restructure and privatization of the low-productive public sector increased the unemployment 
of state-sector workers. When the governments failed to facilitate job opportunities in the “new” 
private sectors, they fell into long-term unemployment (in European countries) or 
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underemployment (in CIS countries) (Rutkowski & Scarpetta, 2005). The ‘hollowing-out’ of 
the state-sector middle class was one of the major forces that increased inequality during the  
transition (Milanovic, 1999). A recent paper found evidence that the past unemployment 
experience left a mental scar, and it explains eight percent of the transition happiness gap 
(Norton et al., 2018).  
 Literature on the transition experience in the labor market reveals that the real wage 
distribution among workers increased after the economic transformation (Milanovic, 1999). 
Before the transition, the wage distribution was compressed under the egalitarian ideology and 
centralized wage-setting system (Rutkowski & Scarpetta, 2005). Using the Slovenian workers 
data from 1987 to 1991, Orazem and Vodopivec (1995) concluded that the relative wages and 
employment increased for the most-educated workers across all economic sectors due to the 
rising returns to skills. Moreover, the wage distribution among equivalent skilled-workers was 
diversified. Female workers were favored because they were concentrated on the less-affected 
sectors. A similar trend was observed in Russia in the early 1990s. The wage inequality 
increased as twice as before the transition because of the rising skill premium within groups. 
Unlike the Slovenian population, Russian female wage declined relative to men across all wage 
distribution (Brainerd, 1998). The degree of wage disparities was extremely high in the CIS 
region compared to the CEE region, partially due to the low minimum wages with weak 
enforcement (Rutkowski & Scarpetta, 2005). 
3.2.2 Inequality - Subjective well-being nexus 
 SWB in this study was measured by survey questions asking to what degree someone 
is satisfied with his/her overall life. SWB contrasts to the traditionally revealed preferences, 
which is based on individuals’ actual choices and decisions (Kahneman & Krueger, 2006). 
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SWB studies highlight behavioral and psychological human nature, which overcomes the 
boundary of revealed preferences and its utility maximization. For example, Easterlin (1974) 
tested the relationship between national economic growth and happiness and found a paradox, 
in which average well-being did not linearly increase with national average income growth. 
Clark et al. (2008) tried to explain the paradox with the notion of ‘relative income,’ compared 
to own objective incomes to others, including own family, coworkers, neighborhood in the 
region (social comparison), or oneself in the past (habituation). An important study of Europe 
found that the income comparison is associated with the lower level of SWB and greater 
preferences for income redistribution in consistent with the relative income theory (Clark & 
Senik, 2010). The impact is not homogenous and differs along the individual sensitivity to 
income distribution, which is modified by social and cultural capital (Bárcena-Martín et al., 
2017). Additionally, Perez-Truglia (2020) found that as income transparency shows actual 
income of neighbors, it widens the gap in SWB between richer and poorer population by 29 
percent. In transition countries, one’s income can be a translation of their current social class 
under the economic transformation (Milanovic, 1999).   
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Table 1. Inequality and life satisfaction in the transition countries context 
Study Data/Methods 
Total effect of inequality 
to life satisfaction or 
SWB 
Mechanism 
Senik (2004) Data: Russia 
Longitudinal 
Monitoring Study 
(RLMS) in Russia  
Methods: ordered 
probit, logit with FE 
+  Tunnel effect  
In a rapidly changing society, 
relative position lose significant, 
and information is used rather used 




Methods: OLS, FE 
- 
(+ for non-transition 
countries) 
An aversion to inequality inherited 




Panel (SOEP) survey 
for West and East 
Germany 
Methods: OLS 
(relative wage) +  Evaluation of one’s absolute 
income with national average 
(relative income) is closely 





GSOEP for Former 
GDR 
Methods: OLS 
+ to the inequality in life 
satisfaction 
Rise in income inequality, growth 






Methods: OLS, FE 
- 
(+ for non-transition 
countries) 
- sense of unfairness 
+ tunnel effect 
Grosfeld & 
Senik (2009) 
Data: CBOS in Poland 
Methods: OLS 
+ at the beginning of 
transition (1992-1996) 
- afterwards (1997-2005) 
+ signal of increased opportunity 
- dissatisfaction of economic 
situation and reforms, skepticism 
about the legitimacy 
Carola & 
Klasen (2012) 
Data: European and 
WVS 
Methods: OLS, FE 
- at the beginning of 
transition (1994-2004),  
not significant later (2005-
2008) 
Preference for equality (inherited 
from socialist system)  
Generational effect with older 
generations feeling less satisfied  
 Previous empirical studies on the inequality and transition nexus showed diverse 
effects of rising inequality on the path to a capitalist democracy in different contexts (Table 1). 
First, the total effect of inequality to the subjective well-being was negative and significant 
except at the beginning of transition in the 1990s. This can be analogically explained as the 
‘tunnel effect’ (Hirschman & Rothschild, 1973). In this metaphor, social mobility is compared 
to a situation of a driver in a tunnel with a heavy traffic jam. He or she might have a good 
feeling and hope when he or she first observes other cars in the next lane move out of the tunnel, 
but it would turn into anger if the situation prolonged. Likewise, increasing inequality at the 
early stage of rapid economic development can be a sign of opportunity to increase one’s 
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welfare in the near future; thus, it can earn society’s tolerance. Existing literature found 
evidence of the tunnel effect in Russia (Senik, 2004), Poland (Grosfeld & Senik, 2009), and 
the transition countries in general (Guriev & Zhuravskaya, 2009). Later, the expectation turns 
into dissatisfaction with economic situations and reforms (Grosfeld & Senik, 2009) and the 
sense of unfairness (Guriev & Zhuravskaya, 2009). 
 Second, rising inequality brought adverse effects to people in the transition countries 
as they inherited a preference for equality (Sanfey & Teksoz, 2007; Carola & Klasen, 2012). 
This comes from a more psychological background assuming that people have a general 
tendency of distaste for inequality and even consider it as a ‘social evil’ (Alesina et al., 2004). 
According to Alesina et al. (2004), distaste for inequality is prominent in a country where a 
redistribution policy is strong. Pre-transition countries were under the communist regime based 
on extensive social policies and compression of income under the socialist regime. Therefore, 
researchers consider the preference for equality as a legacy of the communist regime.  
 Third, pervasive inequality increases not only dissatisfaction with life but also 
inequality in life satisfaction between demographic groups (Easterlin, 2009). Research pointed 
out that inequality in the transition countries is caused by rising income inequality, growth of 
unemployment, and demise of social policies. Other researches focused on the role of relative 
income to life satisfaction in transition (Easterlin & Plagnol, 2008). The level of inequality can 
affect the perceived income level in a society, hence the negative impact on the SWB.  
 Although the social-psychological mechanism (rising unemployment, distaste the 
inequality, the importance of relative income, etc.) is considered as an explanation of the 
‘transition happiness gap,’ the dimension of job satisfaction has not been discussed in the 
previous literature. Therefore, this research aims to fill the gap between inequality and 
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happiness in the domain of workplace.  
3.2.3 Job satisfaction by gender  
 Happiness at work or job satisfaction is an important subdimension of one’s SWB, and 
it is significantly positively correlated with each other (Bowling et al., 2010). Moreover, job 
satisfaction can have a spillover effect on another domain of SWB, such as marital happiness. 
For example, a high level of stress in the work domain can reduce family satisfaction and 
increase the level of work-family conflict (Carlson & Kacmar, 2000). Job satisfaction is also 
an important determinant in labor mobility (Freeman, 1978; Green, 2010), productivity (Fisher, 
2010; Böckerman & Ilmakunnas, 2012), and mental health, such as burnout, self-esteem, 
depression, and anxiety (Faragher et al., 2005). Individuals from post-communist countries 
inherited the legacy of less satisfaction with their jobs and more support the state intervention 
in the job market (Blanchflower & Freeman, 1997). Apart from the legacy of communism, the 
low level of subjective well-being in the work domain is affected by the after transition 
consolidation period, which is featured by the increasing instability in jobs, mismatches 
between employees and the job market, and wage arrears (Selezneva, 2011). 
 Job satisfaction can be used to measure job quality considering that one cannot add all 
job determinants except for apparent objective job quality, such as income, hours, and job 
security (Clark, 2011). However, job satisfaction does not accurately reflect objective job 
characteristics (salary, working day, unemployment rate, or distribution) as it includes workers’ 
expectations and adaptation (de Bustillo Llorente & Mac´ıas, 2005). In line with this theoretical 
background, Clark (1997) raised the gender-job satisfaction paradox. His argument is that 
although females are treated worse in the job market than males (gender pay gap, employment, 
job content, opportunities for promotion, discrimination, etc.), females report a higher level of 
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job satisfaction. He tested four explanations: difference in tasks, expectations at work, sample 
selection problem, and differentials in expectations. Clark concluded that females evaluate their 
jobs more generously than males as their position has already improved in the labor market, 
and their expectation at work is not high as their male counterparts. His empirical test suggested 
that females’ higher expectation is transitory as the gender differential is not found for young 
and highly educated workers as well as those in the professional jobs. 
 Other studies also tried to explain the gender-job satisfaction paradox. Zou (2015) 
found that work orientation is closely associated with job satisfaction, and different work 
orientation makes gender satisfaction differentials. Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza (2000) also 
pointed out the gender difference in values. While females value “soft” aspects of a job (good 
relations with management), males have a tendency to value “hard” aspects (payment and job 
security). Bender et al. (2005) argue that women report higher job satisfaction in female 
dominated workplaces as those jobs provide job flexibility, which females highly value. When 
it comes to the trend of female job satisfaction, Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza (2003) argue that 
the paradoxical situation is transitory as female expectation changes over time.  
 Under the communist regime, females were treated better in the labor market due to 
favorable social policies, such as high minimum wages, maternity leave, and childcare systems 
(Brainerd, 2000). However, the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market 
economy brought both advantages and challenges to females in the region. On the negative 
side, females experienced more unemployment and underemployment than men (LaFont, 
2001), a decrease in female dominant low-wage jobs (Brainerd, 2000), and a sharp decline in 
the financial support for children (Paci, 2002). On the positive side, females benefited from the 
increased rate of returns to education (Boeri & Terrell, 2002). Lange (2008) investigated job 
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satisfaction by gender in Central and Eastern Europe, and he found that being the main earner, 
high income, higher educational achievements, and hours of work have a strong and positive 
impact on males. On the other hand, middle and upper educational degrees showed a negative 
effect on females reflecting that there are perceived barriers in the workplace for females who 
achieved higher educational attainments. Likewise, the hours of work were negatively 
associated with females’ job satisfaction as a response to the work-family conflict from long 
working hours.  
 The higher wage difference by gender at the top of the wage distribution is called the 
‘glass ceiling effect’ (Albrecht et al., 2003). As the wage distribution is highly associated with 
educational attainment, the glass ceiling effect refers to the barriers that highly educated 
females face when they enter managerial occupations. Glass ceiling occurs due to various 
factors such as the labor market discrimination (Cotter et al., 2001), psychological attributes 
and demand for flexibility (Bertrand, 2018). In transition countries, Semykina and Linz (2013) 
found that the perceived career opportunity of being a senior-level of employee was positively 
correlated with job satisfaction in six post-socialist countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Serbia). 
3.3. Data and Methods 
 The empirical studies in this chapter are divided into two categories; one is the 
regression of job satisfaction on the individual and job characteristics and the gender equality 
index (both objective and subjective terms), and the other is the regression of happiness on 
work orientations. This study used two datasets for each empirical test, taking advantage of 
each dataset. First, for the job satisfaction regression, the third wage of LITS was used. The 
dataset was produced by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in 
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collaboration with the World Bank. It has started in 2006 and conducted two more waves in 
2010 and 2016. The LITS Ⅲ survey for 33 countries, the most recent dataset, included twenty 
six transition countries4 and seven other countries5. The strength of the third wave of LITS 
conducted in the year 2016 followed by the 2006 and 2010 surveys is the detailed survey on 
the labor status (including wage) and the perception on the females’ role in the economic and 
political arenas. The summary statistics are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Summary statistics (LITS dataset for the job satisfaction regression) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age 30,579 42.08136 13.03457 18 64 
Age squared 30,579 1940.736 1100.243 324 4096 
Female 30,579 0.554989 0.496975 0 1 
Tertiary level educated 30,579 0.262566 0.440036 0 1 
Health status (subjective) 30,460 3.63759 0.873577 1 5 
      
Marital status      
Married 30,579 0.611989 0.487305 0 1 
Single 30,579 0.22074 0.414752 0 1 
baseline: widowed, divorced, separated      
      
Number of children 30,579 0.611138 0.967032 0 8 
Number of the elderly 30,579 0.123974 0.372418 0 3 
Household size 30,067 3.038414 1.651772 1 10 
      
Dwellings and assets      
Detached house 30,579 0.571994 0.494798 0 1 
Part of house 30,579 0.045227 0.207805 0 1 
Apartment in building with less than 10 dwellings 30,579 0.063671 0.24417 0 1 
Apartment in building with 10 or more dwellings 30,579 0.30812 0.461724 0 1 
baseline: hostel, primitive/mobile dwellings, others    
      
Employment status      
Employee 17,572 0.880662 0.324195 0 1 
Self-employed, employer, unpaid 17,572 0.119338 0.324195 0 1 
unemployed 6,490 0.191371 0.393411 0 1 
inactive 6,490 0.69661 0.459758 0 1 
      
Log(hourly wage) 11,358 1.074362 1.173462 -7.1038 7.543308 
Hours of work 17,572 40.57276 13.05499 1 140 
      
Sector of economic activities      
Agriculture/forest/fishing 17,572 0.070396 0.255821 0 1 
Mining 17,572 0.009276 0.095868 0 1 
Construction 17,572 0.086843 0.281612 0 1 
Manufacturing 17,572 0.112395 0.31586 0 1 
Transport and public utilities 17,572 0.065787 0.247916 0 1 
Wholesale trade 17,572 0.034145 0.181607 0 1 
Retail trade 17,572 0.092306 0.289466 0 1 
                                           
4 Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. 
5 Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Italy, Kosovo, Mongolia, Turkey. 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Finance, insurance, real estate 17,572 0.048828 0.215514 0 1 
Service 17,572 0.247553 0.431603 0 1 
baseline: public administration, nonclassifiable establishments   
      
Types of business      
Public sector 17,572 0.161109 0.367642 0 1 
State-owned enterprise 17,572 0.147906 0.355017 0 1 
Bank 17,572 0.013658 0.11607 0 1 
Foreign firms 17,572 0.034771 0.183205 0 1 
      
Second job 17,572 0.057762 0.2333 0 1 
      
Firm size      
11 to 20 people 16,931 0.172051 0.377436 0 1 
21 to 100 people 16,931 0.264308 0.440977 0 1 
101 or more people 16,931 0.176009 0.380839 0 1 
baseline: 1 to 10 people      
      
Contractual arrangement       
permanent with a written contract 15,475 0.738998 0.439195 0 1 
permanent without a written contract  15,475 0.092795 0.290154 0 1 
temporary (fixed-term) with a written contract  15,475 0.091567 0.288423 0 1 
temporary (fixed-term) without a written contract 15,475 0.019257 0.137431 0 1 
baseline: seasonal/daily labourer           
 Note. 26 transition countries (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina., Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Rep., Estonia, FYR 
Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Rep., Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak 
Rep., Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan) are included 
 Second, the happiness regression was based on the WVS, which is a comprehensive 
dataset of questionnaires on changing values and their effects on social, political, and economic 
life. The WVS enables cross-country comparison studies in the region of the transition 
countries, including the pre-transition period. It contains survey questions on work orientation 
by asking interviewees the following question; “Here are some more aspects of a job that 
people say are important. Please look at them and tell me which ones you personally think are 
important in a job?” The presented job aspects were “good pay, not too much pressure, good 
job security, a job respected by people in general, good hours, an opportunity to use initiative, 
generous holidays, a job in which you feel you can achieve something, a responsible job.” Also, 
it has questions on the values of individual attitudes, such as “we need larger income differences 
as incentives for individual effort, private ownership of business and industry should be 
increased, people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves” as well as “when 
jobs are scarce, men (citizens) should have more right to a job than women (immigrants).” 
 The WVS covers twenty-four transition countries from the 1980s to the early 2000s as 
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listed in Table 2, and the total number is 43,463 individuals. Among them, Belarus (1990), 
Hungary (1982), Russian Federation (1990), and Slovak Republic (1990) citizens were 
interviewed before the transition6. The summary statistics are described in Table 3 and Table 4.  
Table 3. Transition countries in WVS  
Country 1982 1990 1991 1995 1996 1997 1998 2001 2002 2003 Total 
Albania 0 0 0 0 0 0 999 0 1,000 0 1,999 
Azerbaijan 0 0 0 0 0 2,002 0 0 0 0 2,002 
Armenia 0 0 0 0 0 2,000 0 0 0 0 2,000 
Bosnia 0 0 0 0 0 0 800 1,200 0 0 2,000 
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 1,072 0 0 0 0 1,072 
Belarus 0 1,015* 0 0 2,092 0 0 0 0 0 3,107 
Croatia 0 0 0 0 1,196 0 0 0 0 0 1,196 
Czech Rep. 0 0 924 0 0 0 1,147 0 0 0 2,071 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 1,021 0 0 0 0 0 1,021 
Georgia 0 0 0 0 2,008 0 0 0 0 0 2,008 
Hungary 1,464* 0 0 0 0 0 650 0 0 0 2,114 
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,043 1,043 
Latvia 0 0 0 0 1,200 0 0 0 0 0 1,200 
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 1,009 0 0 0 0 1,009 
Moldova 0 0 0 0 984 0 0 0 1,008 0 1,992 
Montenegro 0 0 0 0 240 0 0 1,060 0 0 1,300 
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 1,153 0 0 0 0 1,153 
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,239 0 0 0 1,239 
Russia 0 1,961* 0 2,040 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,001 
Serbia 0 0 0 0 1,280 0 0 1,200 0 0 2,480 
Slovakia 0 466* 0 0 0 0 1,095 0 0 0 1,561 
Slovenia 0 0 0 1,007 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,007 
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 2,811 0 0 0 0 0 2,811 
Macedonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 995 1,055 0 0 2,050 
            
Total 1,464 3,442 924 3,047 12,832 7,236 6,925 4,515 2,008 1,043 43,436 
* Before the transition period 
Table 4. Summary statistics (WVS dataset for the happiness regression) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Happiness 74,184 2.857597 0.875025 1 10 
Female 74,184 0.544147 0.498051 0 1 
Age 72,677 43.66032 16.67576 16 97 
Age squared 74,184 2140.245 1591.792 1 9,409 
Education 65,719 5.017894 2.058478 1 8 
      
Income (subjective) 66,585 4.554239 2.263015 1 10 
      
Fulltime 74,184 0.401677 0.490241 0 1 
Part-time 74,184 0.055066 0.22811 0 1 
Self-employed 74,184 0.052127 0.222285 0 1 
Unemployed 74,184 0.09463 0.292705 0 1 
      
Chief wage earner 68,789 0.501723 0.500001 0 1 
Married 74,184 0.657379 0.474589 0 1 
Single 74,184 0.179527 0.383795 0 1 
      
Work orientation      
Pay 43,436 0.889815 0.313124 0 1 
Pressure 43,436 0.383277 0.48619 0 1 
                                           
6 The transition year: Belarus (1992), Hungary (1990), Poland (1990), Russian Federation (1992), Slovak 
Republic (1991) (Fischer & Sahay, 2004) 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Security 43,436 0.715812 0.451032 0 1 
Respect 43,436 0.4901 0.499908 0 1 
Hour 43,436 0.507966 0.499942 0 1 
Initiative 43,436 0.386546 0.486964 0 1 
Holiday 43,436 0.342941 0.474698 0 1 
Achieve 43,436 0.533313 0.498895 0 1 
Responsive 43,436 0.355742 0.478743 0 1 
      
Male job 1st 70,755 1.9828 0.905943 1 3 
Citizen job 1st 70,222 2.585486 0.730249 1 3 
More incentive 69,890 5.776148 2.988301 1 10 
More private 74,184 6.255864 3.690642 1 16 
Self-responsibility 74,184 4.450043 3.372483 1 16 
 
 Clark (1997) addressed the theoretical framework of the utility function (u) of job 
satisfaction as a sub-utility of SWB as follows. 
u = u (y, h, i, j, E) 
 One’s utility from work (u) is determined by income (y), hours of work (h), individual 
characteristics (i), job-specific characteristics (j), and finally a vector of comparison levels (or 
expectation, E). Higher expectation (E) lowers the current job satisfaction, and vice versa. 
Clark (1997) argues that the low level of expectation from job is the reason of high job 
satisfaction of females. The empirical equations to test the hypothesis is as follows. 
 For the job satisfaction regression, this chapter employed the methodology used by 
Perugini and Vladisavljević (2019).  
𝐽𝑆𝑖𝑘 =  𝛽𝑜 +  𝛽1𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑘 +  𝑋′𝑖𝑘𝑛𝛾𝑛 + 𝑢𝑘 + 𝐼𝑀𝑅′𝑖𝑘𝑚𝜆𝑚 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘 
 𝐽𝑆𝑖𝑘 is the level of job satisfaction of individual (i) in country (k). LITS asked its 
interviewees about how much they agree with the sentence “all things considered, I am satisfied 
with my job as a whole,” and the answers were coded from strongly disagree (1) to strongly 
agree (5). 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑘 is a dummy variable equals to 1 if one is a female. 𝑋′𝑖𝑘𝑛 is a matrix of 
individual and job characteristics, including age, age squared, marital status, education 
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(whether one has attained more than tertiary-level education), log of hourly wage, working 
hour in a week, sector of work, owner of firm, presence of an additional job, size of firm, and 
contract type.  
𝐼𝑀𝑅′𝑖𝑘𝑚 is the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) based on the probability to be four work status (an 
employee, a self-employed or others, an unemployed, an inactive) following the estimation 
variables, including age, age squared, education, marital status, the number of children and 
elderlies, household size, health status, and the type of house ownership. 𝐼𝑀𝑅′𝑖𝑘𝑚 is to correct 
the selection bias for the samples of employees in the regression, and it is not determined 
randomly. Females not satisfied with their jobs might want to do housework more frequently 
than males do (Perugini & Vladisavljević, 2019). 𝑢𝑘 is a country dummy, and 𝜀𝑖𝑘 is an error 
term. The regression was conducted using both ordinary least squares (OLS) and ordered probit 
methods. 
For the happiness regression, below empirical equation was used.  
𝐻𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑦 =  𝛽𝑜 + 𝛽1𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑘𝑦 +  𝑋′𝑖𝑘𝑦𝑛𝛾𝑛 + 𝑢𝑘 + 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒′𝑖𝑘𝑦𝑚𝜆𝑚 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑦 
 𝐻𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑦 is the self-declared sense of happiness scaled from “not at all happy 
(1)” to “very happy (4)” of individual i in country k of year y. 𝑋′𝑖𝑘𝑦𝑛 is the matrices of 
individual and job characteristics, such as age, age squared, education (1 inadequately 
completed elementary education, 2 completed (compulsory) elementary education, 3 
incomplete secondary school, 4 completed secondary school, 5 incomplete secondary, 6 
completed secondary, 7 some university without degree, 8 university with degree), work status 
(full-time, part-time, self-employed, unemployed), being a chief wage earner, and marital status. 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒′𝑖𝑘𝑦𝑚 is a set of individuals values, including work orientations. 𝑢𝑘 and 𝜀𝑖𝑘 are a 
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country dummy and an error term, respectively.  
3.4. Key findings 
3.4.1. Job satisfaction in the transition countries  
 Figure 2 shows the comparison at the aggregate level between job satisfaction and 
income level (log of GDP per capita (PPP adjusted) and the log of hourly wage). The graph 
shows a linear trend between job satisfaction and living, except for Italy, Cyprus, Greece 
(where the income level is high but the job satisfaction level is low), and Tajikistan7 (where 
job satisfaction is high despite the low-income level). The linear relationship looks stronger 
with national wealth (GDP per capita) than individual wage. The result suggests that job 
satisfaction is determined other than the objective income level, and one of the possible hidden 
determinants is value and expectation as Clark (1997) indicated. 
  
                                           
7 The sample of Uzbekistan reported higher log of hourly wage compared to their GDP per capita level.  
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Figure 2. Cross-country comparison of job satisfaction by income level 
 
 




 Table 5 shows the determinants of job satisfaction and its direction as well as the 
magnitude of correlation. Supporting the existing gender-job satisfaction paradox in the 
transition countries’ context, females reported a higher job satisfaction level than males based 
on a 0.05 scale. The coefficient for the female dummy was a proxy for gender differentials 
arising from lower expectations as other individual and job characteristics were controlled 
(Perugini & Vladisavljević, 2019). Log of hourly wage and working hour were positively 
associated with job satisfaction. In the literature, hours were negatively correlated, but in this 
research, the number of working hours was associated with the full-time and part-time working 
status. The part-time status is usually correlated negatively with job satisfaction especially in 
developing countries (López Bóo et al., 2010).  
 Age did not show a significant result, yet married and well-educated individuals 
reported higher job satisfaction. The positive coefficient of the tertiary (or higher) education 
dummy contrasts from the empirical result of other developed regions (Clark, 1997; Perugini 
& Vladisavljević, 2019), where highly educated people reported less satisfaction at work 
possibly due to high expectation or skills mismatch. The positive association between 
education and job satisfaction can be interpreted as individuals with tertiary education are 
rewarded better than their expectations.  
 The job sectors also affected job satisfaction. Compared to public administration 
(which was omitted in the regression table), agriculture, construction, manufacturing, 
transportation and public utilities, trade (both wholesale and retail trade), and services jobs 
were negatively and significantly associated with job satisfaction. This result supports that the 
public sector employment provides better job quality; therefore, it brings higher job satisfaction 
(Aleksynska, 2018).  
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 In line with the previous literature, the public ownership of firms showed a positive 
association with job satisfaction, compared to private sector enterprises (omitted from the 
result). Individuals in large firms also reported higher job satisfaction supporting the previous 
research (Clark, 1997). Contract type was also an important determinant of job satisfaction, 
and the result showed that permanent contract satisfies more for their jobs, also supporting the 
previous research (Aleksynska, 2018). The result did not apply differently by the existence of 
a written contract book, and it means that the contract type is more important than the forms of 




Table 5. Job satisfaction in the transition countries (baseline regression) 
 OLS Ordered Probit 
 (1) (2) 
 Job satisfaction Job satisfaction 
     
Female 0.0522* (0.0258) 0.0572** (0.0277) 
ln wage 0.0501** (0.0205) 0.0588** (0.0236) 
Hours 0.00157 (0.00108) 0.00238* (0.00126) 
Age 0.00366 (0.0185) 0.00484 (0.0207) 
Age squared 0.0000177 (0.000226) 0.0000108 (0.000251) 
Married 0.212*** (0.0317) 0.229*** (0.0341) 
Tertiary education 0.194*** (0.0282) 0.232*** (0.0337) 
Agriculture, Forestry, 
and Fishing 
-0.109** (0.0444) -0.131*** (0.0466) 
Mining -0.198 (0.146) -0.239 (0.153) 
Construction -0.135*** (0.0387) -0.154*** (0.0433) 
Manufacturing -0.195*** (0.0394) -0.227*** (0.0435) 
Transportation and 
public utilities 
-0.0558 (0.0357) -0.0745* (0.0423) 
Wholesale trade -0.0828 (0.0552) -0.110* (0.0598) 
Retail trade -0.245*** (0.0452) -0.278*** (0.0486) 
Finance, Insurance, 
and Real Estate 
0.0674 (0.0540) 0.0701 (0.0638) 




0.0636* (0.0371) 0.0745* (0.0420) 
State-owned enterprise 0.0609 (0.0374) 0.0702* (0.0421) 
Bank 0.0512 (0.0778) 0.0169 (0.0932) 
Foreign firm 0.0883 (0.0604) 0.123* (0.0692) 
Having a second job -0.0328 (0.0345) -0.0336 (0.0401) 
Firm size 11-20 0.00266 (0.0232) -0.00967 (0.0278) 
Firm size 21-100 0.0930*** (0.0299) 0.101*** (0.0330) 
Firm size 101 or more 0.142*** (0.0466) 0.162*** (0.0503) 
Permanent with a 
written contract 
0.291*** (0.0689) 0.317*** (0.0647) 
Permanent without a 
written contract 
0.204** (0.0808) 0.224*** (0.0789) 
Temporary (fixed-
term) with a written 
contract 
0.0813 (0.0819) 0.0856 (0.0810) 
Temporary (fixed-
term) without a written 
contract 
-0.0945 (0.130) -0.0613 (0.130) 
IMR1(employee) -0.0139 (0.773) -0.0489 (0.848) 
IMR2(self_employed, 
employer, unpaid) 
-0.119 (0.329) -0.158 (0.362) 
IMR3(unemployed) 0.839*** (0.243) 0.984*** (0.269) 
IMR4(inactive) 1.256*** (0.209) 1.423*** (0.231) 
     
country dummies yes  yes  
     
Constant 0.446 (1.150)   
Cut1   0.388 (1.228) 
Cut2   1.153 (1.240) 
Cut3   1.835 (1.234) 
Cut4   3.384*** (1.231) 
     
N 10,719  10,719  
R-sq 0.118    




3.4.2. Work orientation by gender in the transition countries  
 This section utilizes the WVS to test work orientation in the post-communist countries 
(see Table 2 for the detailed list of countries). Work orientation is closely associated with one’s 
job satisfaction, and it is a useful concept to understand job differentials in job satisfaction (Zou, 
2015). It is also a part of norms and expectations that determine job satisfaction (Brown et al., 
2012) as well as an evaluation of jobs for different rewards from employment (Zou, 2015). The 
dependent variable here was set as happiness rather than job satisfaction as the variable “job 
satisfaction” was asked within a very limited time frame with limited samples.  
 Table 6 shows the results. The self-reported SWB decreased with age and then 
increased after age hit 60. Education and income were positively correlated with happiness, 
and unemployed status was negatively and significantly associated. Consistent to the previous 
literature, being a chief wage earner was positively correlated with the SWB as the role of the 
main earner strengthened the male identity in the transition period (Lange, 2008). Married and 
single individuals were happier than others (widowed, separated, and divorced).  
 Concerning work orientation, while the pursuit of good payment was negatively 
correlated, respect and responsiveness at work were positively correlated with one’s happiness. 
Males and females showed the same tendency (same direction to the respective coefficients), 
and this is adversary evidence of existing literature where males value “hard” aspects of work 
outputs (high income and job security), and females value “soft” aspects (such as good 
relationship) in the transition countries (Sousa-Poza & Sousa-Poza, 2000).  
 When males were prioritized in the event of job scarcity, males became less happy 
while females reported a stronger happiness level. The prioritization of male employees might 
lower (increase) the job satisfaction of females (males); thus, it gives the contrasting direction 
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of impact. The pro-market economy values (more incentives, more private, and self-
responsibility) were positively associated with happiness in the transition countries.  
Table 6. Work orientation by gender in the transition countries  








    
Female 0.00220   
 (0.0107)   
    
Age -0.0236*** -0.0229*** -0.0247*** 
 (0.00198) (0.00303) (0.00264) 
    
Age squared 0.000207*** 0.000206*** 0.000215*** 
 (0.0000212) (0.0000325) (0.0000283) 
    
Education 0.0200*** 0.0227*** 0.0185*** 
 (0.00257) (0.00376) (0.00355) 
    
Income 0.0331*** 0.0331*** 0.0332*** 
 (0.00232) (0.00336) (0.00324) 
    
Fulltime 0.00568 0.0142 0.00923 
 (0.0139) (0.0225) (0.0181) 
    
Part-time -0.00538 -0.00144 -0.000711 
 (0.0226) (0.0361) (0.0291) 
    
Self-employed 0.00236 0.0168 -0.00807 
 (0.0235) (0.0314) (0.0405) 
    
Unemployed -0.124*** -0.0797*** -0.142*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0276) (0.0248) 
    
Chief wage earner -0.0136 0.0723*** -0.0783*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0174) (0.0162) 
    
Married 0.315*** 0.316*** 0.280*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0271) (0.0194) 
    
Single 0.118*** 0.177*** 0.0778*** 
 (0.0206) (0.0342) (0.0263) 
    
Pay -0.0827*** -0.0654*** -0.0945*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0248) (0.0222) 
    
Pressure -0.00651 -0.0124 -0.000579 
 (0.0106) (0.0156) (0.0146) 
    
Security 0.00880 -0.00365 0.0203 
 (0.0115) (0.0167) (0.0158) 
    
Respect 0.0375*** 0.0463*** 0.0284** 
 (0.0105) (0.0152) (0.0144) 
    
Hour -0.000659 -0.0169 0.0133 
 (0.0105) (0.0153) (0.0144) 
    
Initiative 0.00321 -0.0148 0.0198 
 (0.0111) (0.0158) (0.0157) 
    
Holiday 0.00401 -0.00407 0.0126 
 (0.0111) (0.0164) (0.0152) 
    
Achieve -0.0000266 -0.00698 0.00843 
 (0.0106) (0.0152) (0.0147) 
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Responsive 0.0779*** 0.0832*** 0.0696*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0156) (0.0153) 
    
Male job 1st -0.00102 -0.0311*** 0.0232*** 
 (0.00536) (0.00795) (0.00731) 
    
Citizen job 1st -0.00631 -0.00375 -0.00868 
 (0.00680) (0.0101) (0.00923) 
    
More incentive 0.00602*** 0.00443* 0.00730*** 
 (0.00173) (0.00254) (0.00236) 
    
More private 0.00896*** 0.00965*** 0.00823*** 
 (0.00162) (0.00241) (0.00218) 
    
Self-responsibility 0.00703*** 0.00508** 0.00802*** 
 (0.00171) (0.00248) (0.00237) 
    
Constant 2.783*** 2.749*** 2.809*** 
 (0.0553) (0.0838) (0.0719) 
    
N 28,573 13,530 15,043 
R-sq 0.066 0.052 0.082 
Note. Country-level fixed effects, significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 Table 7 shows the comparison of work values before and after the transition by 
adopting fixed effects at the country level. After the transition, values of good pay and good 
job security increased with strong significance while other values, including less pressure, good 
hours, initiative work, generous holidays, and a responsible job decreased their importance 
among work orientations. Females less valued the good payment (hard value) and more valued 
the good hours and generous holiday (soft values), supporting the previous literature (Sousa-
Poza & Sousa-Poza, 2000). Additionally, females had lower work orientation in the 
opportunities to use initiatives, achievement, and responsibility than males in the transition 
countries. Female work orientation did not significantly change after the transition, considering 




Table 7. Work orientation change after the transition  
  Coef. Std. Err. t 
Good pay (N=36,912)       
After 0.027 0.009 2.880 
Female -0.032 0.011 -2.980 
After*Female 0.021 0.011 1.830 
Age 0.002 0.001 3.630 
Age square 0.000 0.000 -5.720 
Income -0.004 0.001 -4.880 
Fulltime 0.012 0.004 2.760 
Part-time -0.005 0.008 -0.620 
Unemployed -0.008 0.006 -1.230 
Constant 0.877 0.015 58.510 
Not too much pressure (N=36,912) 
After -0.184 0.015 -12.580 
Female 0.001 0.017 0.040 
After*Female 0.033 0.017 1.900 
Age 0.000 0.001 0.020 
Age square 0.000 0.000 -0.560 
Income -0.008 0.001 -6.530 
Fulltime -0.022 0.007 -3.410 
Part-time 0.033 0.012 2.780 
Unemployed -0.008 0.010 -0.800 
Constant 0.582 0.023 25.020 
Good job security (N=36,912) 
After 0.197 0.013 14.750 
Female -0.017 0.015 -1.110 
After*Female 0.016 0.016 0.990 
Age 0.006 0.001 7.610 
Age square 0.000 0.000 -6.540 
Income -0.009 0.001 -8.920 
Fulltime 0.040 0.006 6.630 
Part-time 0.013 0.011 1.140 
Unemployed 0.030 0.009 3.380 
Constant 0.414 0.021 19.440 
A respected job (N=36,912)    
After 0.018 0.015 1.170 
Female -0.001 0.017 -0.030 
After*Female 0.011 0.018 0.590 
Age -0.001 0.001 -1.630 
Age square 0.000 0.000 2.520 
Income 0.007 0.001 5.570 
Fulltime 0.024 0.007 3.520 
Part-time 0.013 0.012 1.060 
Unemployed 0.006 0.010 0.560 
Constant 0.440 0.024 18.300 
Good hours (N=36,912)    
After -0.086 0.015 -5.690 
Female 0.115 0.017 6.600 
After*Female -0.027 0.018 -1.480 
Age 0.002 0.001 2.210 
Age square 0.000 0.000 -4.430 
Income -0.005 0.001 -3.940 
Fulltime -0.003 0.007 -0.420 
Part-time 0.065 0.013 5.190 
Unemployed 0.005 0.010 0.520 
Constant 0.552 0.024 22.800 
An opportunity to use initiative (N=36,912)   
After -0.104 0.015 -7.070 
Female -0.088 0.017 -5.200 
After*Female 0.027 0.018 1.550 
Age -0.002 0.001 -2.710 
Age square 0.000 0.000 0.890 
Income 0.016 0.001 13.500 
Fulltime 0.013 0.007 2.000 
Part-time 0.032 0.012 2.600 
Unemployed -0.037 0.010 -3.840 
Constant 0.524 0.023 22.310 
Generous holidays (N=36,912) 
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  Coef. Std. Err. t 
After -0.141 0.014 -9.780 
Female 0.052 0.017 3.120 
After*Female -0.024 0.017 -1.410 
Age -0.001 0.001 -1.140 
Age square 0.000 0.000 -0.950 
Income -0.003 0.001 -2.220 
Fulltime 0.015 0.006 2.360 
Part-time 0.062 0.012 5.250 
Unemployed 0.009 0.009 0.970 
Constant 0.519 0.023 22.530 
That you can achieve something (N=36,912)   
After 0.019 0.015 1.270 
Female -0.054 0.017 -3.110 
After*Female 0.015 0.018 0.820 
Age -0.007 0.001 -7.710 
Age square 0.000 0.000 4.790 
Income 0.015 0.001 12.670 
Fulltime 0.006 0.007 0.860 
Part-time 0.010 0.012 0.780 
Unemployed -0.032 0.010 -3.250 
Constant 0.661 0.024 27.680 
A responsible job (N=36,912) 
After -0.030 0.014 -2.090 
Female -0.041 0.016 -2.460 
After*Female -0.010 0.017 -0.560 
Age -0.001 0.001 -1.530 
Age square 0.000 0.000 2.340 
Income 0.005 0.001 4.630 
Fulltime 0.031 0.006 4.850 
Part-time -0.005 0.012 -0.390 
Unemployed -0.014 0.009 -1.490 
Constant 0.372 0.023 16.260 
Note. Country-level fixed effects, significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
3.5. Discussion 
The country-level fixed effects regression in this study used normal standard errors. 
However, academic research papers are often required to use clustered standard errors by 
country level. Therefore, in this discussion chapter, clustered standard errors are applied for the 
regression results presented from Table 6 to 7. In Table 8 (which is the replication of Table 6), 
males and females also show the same tendency at work orientation with values. The payment 
was negatively associated with happiness while respected jobs and responsiveness were 





Table 8. Work orientation by gender in the transition countries  








    
Female 0.00220   
 (0.0118)   
    
Age -0.0236*** -0.0229*** -0.0247*** 
 (0.00237) (0.00241) (0.00282) 
    
Age squared 0.000207*** 0.000206*** 0.000215*** 
 (0.0000281) (0.0000290) (0.0000322) 
    
Education 0.0200*** 0.0227*** 0.0185*** 
 (0.00394) (0.00540) (0.00430) 
    
Income 0.0331*** 0.0331*** 0.0332*** 
 (0.00709) (0.00792) (0.00685) 
    
Fulltime 0.00568 0.0142 0.00923 
 (0.0190) (0.0303) (0.0219) 
    
Part-time -0.00538 -0.00144 -0.000711 
 (0.0173) (0.0409) (0.0179) 
    
Self-employed 0.00236 0.0168 -0.00807 
 (0.0321) (0.0455) (0.0404) 
    
Unemployed -0.124*** -0.0797*** -0.142*** 
 (0.0240) (0.0224) (0.0379) 
    
Chief wage earner -0.0136 0.0723*** -0.0783*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0164) (0.0177) 
    
Married 0.315*** 0.316*** 0.280*** 
 (0.0246) (0.0339) (0.0230) 
    
Single 0.118*** 0.177*** 0.0778** 
 (0.0262) (0.0277) (0.0358) 
    
Pay -0.0827*** -0.0654*** -0.0945*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0153) (0.0198) 
    
Pressure -0.00651 -0.0124 -0.000579 
 (0.0139) (0.0157) (0.0171) 
    
Security 0.00880 -0.00365 0.0203 
 (0.0126) (0.0171) (0.0156) 
    
Respect 0.0375** 0.0463** 0.0284* 
 (0.0133) (0.0180) (0.0164) 
    
Hour -0.000659 -0.0169 0.0133 
 (0.0138) (0.0182) (0.0132) 
    
Initiative 0.00321 -0.0148 0.0198 
 (0.0158) (0.0176) (0.0183) 
    
Holiday 0.00401 -0.00407 0.0126 
 (0.0139) (0.0178) (0.0164) 
    
Achieve -0.0000266 -0.00698 0.00843 
 (0.00984) (0.0167) (0.0135) 
    
Responsive 0.0779*** 0.0832*** 0.0696*** 
 (0.0169) (0.0194) (0.0186) 
    
Male job 1st -0.00102 -0.0311*** 0.0232** 
 (0.00844) (0.00919) (0.0104) 
    
Citizen job 1st -0.00631 -0.00375 -0.00868 
 (0.0137) (0.0159) (0.0149) 
    
More incentive 0.00602** 0.00443 0.00730** 
 (0.00267) (0.00336) (0.00317) 
    
More private 0.00896*** 0.00965*** 0.00823*** 
 (0.00217) (0.00330) (0.00205) 
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Self-responsibility 0.00703*** 0.00508* 0.00802** 
 (0.00190) (0.00265) (0.00286) 
    
Constant 2.783*** 2.749*** 2.809*** 
 (0.0696) (0.0790) (0.0821) 
    
N 28,573 13,530 15,043 
R-sq 0.066 0.052 0.082 
Note. Country-level fixed effects, Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses, significance levels: * p<0.1, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Table 9 shows the results of Table 7 with clustered standard errors. The value of good job 
security, initiative, and generous holidays remains significant. Females value good hours and 
generous holidays while they less valued an opportunity to take initiatives and achieve bigger 
things. Just as Table 7, females’ work orientations did not change after the transition 
(After*Female coefficients were not significant) except when taking initiatives (positive) and 
responsibility (negative) in jobs. 
Table 9. Work orientation change after the transition  
  Coef. Std. Err. t 
Good pay (N=36,912)       
After 0.027 0.025 1.09 
Female -0.032 0.019 -1.66 
After*Female 0.021 0.020 1.03 
Age 0.002 0.001 2.37 
Age square 0.000 0.000 -3.95 
Income -0.004 0.001 -4.08 
Fulltime 0.012 0.007 1.63 
Part-time -0.005 0.011 -0.44 
Unemployed -0.008 0.007 -1.01 
Constant 0.877 0.033 26.91 
Not too much pressure (N=36,912) 
After -0.184 0.125 -1.47 
Female 0.001 0.019 0.04 
After*Female 0.033 0.019 1.71 
Age 0.000 0.001 0.01 
Age square 0.000 0.000 0.31 
Income -0.008 0.002 -3.12 
Fulltime -0.022 0.015 -1.49 
Part-time 0.033 0.010 3.25 
Unemployed -0.008 0.015 -0.5 
Constant 0.582 0.118 4.94 
Good job security (N=36,912) 
After 0.197 0.063 3.15 
Female -0.017 0.031 -0.54 
After*Female 0.016 0.032 0.49 
Age 0.006 0.001 6.73 
Age square 0.000 0.000 5.84 
Income -0.009 0.002 -4.96 
Fulltime 0.040 0.007 5.69 
Part-time 0.013 0.015 0.86 
Unemployed 0.030 0.011 2.73 
Constant 0.414 0.054 7.7 
A respected job (N=36,912)    
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  Coef. Std. Err. t 
After 0.018 0.051 0.34 
Female -0.001 0.011 -0.05 
After*Female 0.011 0.012 0.89 
Age -0.001 0.002 -0.96 
Age square 0.000 0.000 1.52 
Income 0.007 0.001 4.53 
Fulltime 0.024 0.013 1.87 
Part-time 0.013 0.018 0.72 
Unemployed 0.006 0.018 0.31 
Constant 0.440 0.059 7.45 
Good hours (N=36,912)    
After -0.086 0.075 -1.15 
Female 0.115 0.018 6.35 
After*Female -0.027 0.019 -1.44 
Age 0.002 0.002 1.25 
Age square 0.000 0.000 2.32 
Income -0.005 0.002 -3.02 
Fulltime -0.003 0.012 -0.24 
Part-time 0.065 0.014 4.76 
Unemployed 0.005 0.016 0.33 
Constant 0.552 0.069 8.04 
An opportunity to use initiative (N=36,912)   
After -0.104 0.049 -2.12 
Female -0.088 0.010 -8.55 
After*Female 0.027 0.010 2.74 
Age -0.002 0.001 -1.85 
Age square 0.000 0.000 0.64 
Income 0.016 0.003 4.94 
Fulltime 0.013 0.008 1.58 
Part-time 0.032 0.012 2.66 
Unemployed -0.037 0.014 -2.63 
Constant 0.524 0.056 9.35 
Generous holidays (N=36,912) 
After -0.141 0.036 -3.97 
Female 0.052 0.010 4.98 
After*Female -0.024 0.015 -1.64 
Age -0.001 0.001 -0.73 
Age square 0.000 0.000 -0.59 
Income -0.003 0.002 -1.39 
Fulltime 0.015 0.009 1.72 
Part-time 0.062 0.014 4.34 
Unemployed 0.009 0.016 0.58 
Constant 0.519 0.040 12.81 
That you can achieve something (N=36,912)   
After 0.019 0.065 0.29 
Female -0.054 0.015 -3.56 
After*Female 0.015 0.015 0.98 
Age -0.007 0.001 -5.46 
Age square 0.000 0.000 3.69 
Income 0.015 0.002 7.27 
Fulltime 0.006 0.012 0.46 
Part-time 0.010 0.017 0.55 
Unemployed -0.032 0.010 -3.21 
Constant 0.661 0.068 9.74 
A responsible job (N=36,912) 
After -0.030 0.015 -0.630 
Female -0.041 0.055 -0.540 
After*Female -0.010 0.015 -2.720 
Age -0.001 0.002 -0.860 
Age square 0.000 0.000 1.530 
Income 0.005 0.002 2.270 
Fulltime 0.031 0.009 3.430 
Part-time -0.005 0.016 -0.290 
Unemployed -0.014 0.011 -1.270 
Constant 0.372 0.073 5.090 
Note. Country-level fixed effects, Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses, significance levels: * p<0.1, 





 Job satisfaction is an important sub-dimension of SWB, and it is a dynamic outcome 
between the socio-economic environment and the psychological mechanism. Under the 
transition, one of the most important factors affecting SWB has been rising inequality due to 
the hollowing out of the middle class, increasing wage differentials, and unemployment. 
Against the backdrop of the socio-economic transformation and rising social inequality, it is 
worth to investigate the gender difference in job satisfaction to understand the reason of 
decreasing SWB or ‘transition happiness gap.’ Rising inequality can provoke the aversion to 
inequality and sense of unfairness, but it is not always on the negative side. Observing social 
mobility in neighborhood, work place, or family, one might bear hopes of his/her own upward 
social mobility, giving a positive feeling for some time until the emotion turns into anger 
(‘tunnel effect’). 
Meanwhile, female workers have been highly likely to report their job satisfaction 
higher than male workers even when controlling individual demographic variables including 
the labor market status (‘the gender-job satisfaction paradox’). The reason of the paradox has 
been explored as females’ low expectations, difference in work values, different work 
orientations, and so on. Among them, this research focused on the hypothesis that male and 
female workers value different aspects in the workplace and it brought different outcomes in 
job satisfaction.  
Under two theoretical backgrounds (rising inequality and the gender-job satisfaction 
paradox), this paper investigated the correlation of norms and expectations to job satisfaction 
by gender as well as individual and job characteristics. In the transition countries, females 
reported higher job satisfaction than males, consistent to the gender-job satisfaction paradox. 
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 The coefficient to the female variable showed a lower expectation to jobs as other 
possible factors were controlled. In addition, high income earners, the more educated, and 
public officials have shown high levels of job satisfaction. All in all, females in the transition 
countries pursued more “soft” values (good hours, generous holidays) while males valued more 
on the “hard” aspect (payment). Increasing inequality in this region strengthened the “hard” 
aspect of job satisfaction which male workers appreciated. This partially explains the gender-
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